SUMMARY
This
study examines the appointments, promotions, postings, and deployments of the
Inspector General of Police (IGP) within the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS)
from 2005 to the present. It appears that most of the time, these decisions are
made based more on relationships to President Kiir, First Vice President Machar,
or IGPs than on job merit, credentials, experiences, or accomplishments. This
does not seem to represent the national character of the nation. The course of
events has demonstrated that SSPS devalues professional seniority and
disparages senior officers and non-commission staff who have several years of
training and work experience in the former Sudan. The majority of competent and
experienced police officers are denied promotions, demoted, or forced into
retirement and placed to non-active list.
In
addition, the SSPS has earned the reputation of being a "tribal police
force" and is devoid of professionalism and expertise in policing, which
is predicated on a dedication to providing safety, protection, and crime
prevention. The SSPS lacks the capacity to safeguard people's assets and lands
and to ensure public safety in a manner that is sustainable, legal, and
efficient.
Furthermore,
this essay contends that since modern democracy is about promoting democratic
advancement, fundamental freedoms, and effective governance, police should not
have the job of stifling democratic ideals. The next 2024 planned general
elections will demonstrate Kiir's tribal police policies and actions, as
organized forces will play a key role and be used to conceal any voting
violations. Election officials, citizens, political parties, and civil rights
advocates will all be coerced into allowing election tampering and establishing
Kiir as president for life.
Finally,
the information gathered demonstrates that, ever since the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) era, members of the Dinka ethnic group have led and dominated
the positions of IGP and Director General of Police in the following states:
Central Equatoria State (CES), Eastern Equatoria State (EES), Western Equatoria
State (WES), Northern Bahar Al-Ghazal (NBG) State, and Western Bahar Al-Ghazal
(WBG). Members of the Nuer ethnic group have been deputized in these roles.
Limiting Kiir's unrestricted executive powers and ending tribal police under
the federal Constitution—which states that police are subject to state
jurisdiction—are the best course of action and the best course of action for
the nation.
ABBREVIATIONS
AG Attorney General
CES Central
Equatoria State
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDP Dinka Development Plan
EES Eastern Equatoria State
EHN Equatoria house niggers
IGP Inspector General of Police
MP Member of Parliament
NIF National Islamic Front
NBG Northern Bahar Al-Ghazal
NSS
National
Security Service
PSC Police service council
SSACGP Southern Sudanese Assistant
Commissioner General of Police
SSLM Southern
Sudan Liberation Movement
SNPS Sudan National Police Service
SSNPS South Sudan National Police Service
SSPSA Southern
Sudan Police Service Act
SPF Sudanese Police forces
SPLA/M Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement
SPLA/IO Sudan
People’s Liberation Army/in Opposition
SSPS Southern
Sudan Police Services
UNMISS United Nations Mission in South Sudan
WBG Western Bahar Al-Ghazal
WES Western Equatoria State
HISTORY
THE
2009 SOUTHERN SUDAN POLICE SERVICE ACT
2009
saw the enactment of the Southern Sudan Police Service Act (SSPSA). The
previous Sudan National Police Act is copied verbatim from Arabic and hasn't
been changed since the country's independence. Its goals are to safeguard
residents and their property, prevent, investigate, and combat crime;
furthermore, it aims to respect and execute the 2005 Southern Sudan Interim
Constitution (SSPS Act, 2005).
Since
the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) was established, its principal duties
have been to protect public safety, uphold the rule of law, and, with some
degree of integrity and compliance with both domestic and international
regulations, Although police responsibilities seem lofty in theory, they are
conspicuously absent from the nation's police force's daily operations (ibid.).
OVERVIEW
The
SSPSA is the source of the malfunctioning SSPS. The Act was drafted by
lawmakers with little experience or familiarity with 21st-century law
enforcement. There are many uncertainties and terminology gaps throughout the
Act. For example, the Act talked about the police service council (PSC) and the
state police, but in actuality, neither organization exists at the state level
across the entire country. The PSC's mission and scope of work, the hiring
procedure, state quotas, and recruitment procedures are all left vague in the
Act. The function of recruitment centers at the national and state levels is
not discussed. The Act specified the minimal educational need but left out
details about higher qualifications, such as the hiring requirements for MA and
Ph.D. holders. Although basic training is one of the prerequisites for aspiring
officers before certification, education is essential for progress and
promotion.
Furthermore,
seniority is listed as a criterion in the Act, but in practice, highly
competent and senior officers were not assigned, promoted, or even deployed.
For example, former IGP Gen. Majak Akech and his successor, Atem Moraul, were
junior officers and captains under senior officers who were not Dinka/Nuer, but
they were promoted at a rapid rate in a way that rendered them superior to
their subordinates and, to some extent, to their former superiors.
Additionally, non-Dinka/Nuer SPLA senior officers who have completed years of
training, experience, and education in the military, police, prison, wildlife,
and customs academies are routinely denied promotions, leadership roles,
assignments, and deployments that they are due and are instead forced to
retire. The misfortune of South Sudan could be described as follows: the
qualified, inexperienced, ill-trained, and potentially illiterate are not only
promoted but also given important assignments, while those with knowledge and
experience are subjected to discrimination, unfair treatments, and
institutionalized marginalization. They are frequently given positions of power
and unrestricted access, which they then exploit to assassinate and forcibly
remove a number of legitimate landowners from their ancestral homes. Check
also Administrative
Corruption, Nepotism, Injustice, and Discrimination in South Sudan for further
information on the problems surrounding promotions, assignments, and
deployments.
Tribal
ties and alliances with the President, First Vice President, and IGP are the
primary criteria used for SSPS promotions. Promotions, assignments, and
deployments do not represent the national character of the nation and are not
determined by job merit, credentials, experiences, or accomplishments.
Professional seniority is not valued by the SSPS, which also disparages senior
officers and non-commission staff who have several years of training and work
experience in the former Sudan. For instance, Kon John Akot, the current director
of traffic police in Juba, was officer Cedet at the Sudanese Military Academy
in Khartoum and fired. He founded an opposition party in Cairo in the early
1990s to oppose the Khartoum regime, and he later returned to Sudan for
personal reasons. The MPs recently called for the Minister of Interior and the
IGP to appear before the Parliament and respond to Akon's illegal traffic
orders & directives (Consult Hon. Simon Kun Puoch of November 13, 2023); John
too is Kiir’s relative. At a time when the nation is facing a shortage in the
retention of well-trained and qualified senior officers who could contribute to
advancing the goals and vision of policing and community policing, cyber and
peace officers, and the professionalization of the SSPS, the majority of highly
qualified officers are either denied promotions, demoted, or forced to retire.
Community policing is mentioned in passing in the SSPSA, but its definition,
vision, goal, and objectives are not included in the Act.
According
to COPS (2014), community policing is a philosophy that encourages
organizational strategies that support the methodical application of
collaborations and problem-solving methods to proactively address the immediate
causes of public safety issues like crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.
EXAMINING
The
overarching strategy of Kiir's organized forces (SSPDF, SSPS, NSS, Correction
Service, Customs, Wildlife, and and Fire Brigade) is to undercut the backgrounds, expertise, and
qualifications of highly skilled and qualified officers, as well as graduates
of the Police Academy and holders of BA, MA, and Ph.D. degrees. Kiir's intended
organized forces policy is to demote and retire competent, well-trained,
qualified, and experienced officers, particularly Equatoria senior Officer who are medically and physically fit and those who assisted in the
establishment of the Southern Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS), and to
promote, assign, and deploy illiterate and corrupt SPLA officers in positions
of authority with unlimited powers. Furthermore, Kiir's tribal police strategy
is intended to evade responsibility and to further the nation's tribalism,
corruption, nepotism, marginalization, and prejudice.
The
results of Kiir's tribal police program will be evident in the upcoming general
elections in 2024, where voters will be intimidated and organized troops will
be used to conceal irregularities in the voting process. In order to carry out
the Dinka Development Plan (DDP), Kiir is assigning his tribe SPLA commanders
to important leadership roles within organized troops, giving them unrestricted
autonomy. Depopulation of Collo, Fertits, and Equatorians from their native
areas is one of DDP's goals. The legitimate owners of lands in Collo, Fertits,
and Equatoria are being forcibly removed, and the IGP and certain SPLA generals
are abusing their unrestricted power and authority to do so (for more
information on the issues surrounding illegal removal, see Annex 1 and Michael Rial Christopher's live video from August 6,
2023). Due to a lack of professionalism in policing to investigate
land corruption, some of the Central Equatoria House niggers1 and
Arua Boys2, who hold important positions in the CES government,
particularly the Governor and Mayor Office, the Ministry of Housing, the Land
Commission, the Court, Ministry of Injustice, Attorney General and the Local Chiefs Office, are helping to facilitate
the illegal removal of rightful owners from their lands in Malakal, Waw, and
Equatoria.
Lacking
a "new professionalism" in policing founded on a dedication to
responsibility, public legitimacy, innovation, and national coherence, the SSPS
is a tribal force. The SSPS is unable to provide individuals with public safety
and lawful, sustainable methods of protecting their homes and lands.
The
following issues are blamed for the SSP force's well-known brutality,
corruption, thefts, and other crimes, as well as its endemic sloth: The
following are the reasons for this: (1) the Constitution gives the President
unrestricted authority to appoint, promote, and assign illiterate, untrained,
and inexperienced officers to positions of authority and to lead professional
organizations; (2) lawmakers rubberstamp laws without understanding the Police
Act, policing, community policing, Cyber and Peace Officers and their
functions, IGP and Police Commissioner Terms of References; (3) appointments,
promotions, and recruitments of IGPs are made based on tribal lines rather than
qualifications, experience, and job merit; (4) the SSPSA doesn't specify the
qualifications and job merits for IGPs and Assistant IGPs appointments and (5)
Since the CPA era and the nation's post-independence period, Dinka people have
led and dominated the role of IGP, Director General of Police, in the CES, EES,
WES, WBG, and NBG States, with Nuer ethnic people serving as deputies.
The
SSPS has fallen short in several areas, including citizen security, public
order maintenance, law enforcement, impartiality and honesty, noncompliance
with the law, and a lack of professionalism in policing grounded in public
accountability, legitimacy with the public, innovation, and national coherence.
FINAL
REMARKS
These
days, modern policing is about being accountable to the people, being
legitimate, being innovative, and fostering national cohesion. Since modern
democracy is about excellent governance, the role of police in a democracy is
not to stifle democratic traditions; rather, professionalism in law enforcement
advances democratic advancement.
The
SSPS's current mission is to defend the interests of Kiir and his clan, who
control the country. It is not held accountable to the public for crimes
committed, nor does it offer an apology for policy or action misbehavior. Under
the Kiir regime, the SPLM political party controls and manipulates policing,
and SSPS has close ties to SPLM political organization. Regarding
accountability, legitimacy, and national cohesion, the SSP has no notion
whatsoever. The SSP is a tribal organization rather than a national one.
Limiting Kiir's unrestricted executive powers and ending tribal police under
the federal Constitution—which places police under state and county
jurisdictions—are the best course of action and the best course of action for
the nation (for more information on federal, state, and county police, see
Annex 2).
PROFILES OF POLICE INSPECTOR
GENERALS & DEPUTIES
1. General Makuei Deng is a member of the Dinka Bor ethnic group from
Jonglei State. He belonged to the Anya Nya 1, formally known the Southern Sudan
Liberation Movement (SSLM), and later joined the Sudan Police Forces (SPF). He
completes his law enforcement studies at the Sudanese Police Academy in
Khartoum. Under the leadership of Abel Alier as President of the High Executive
Council and Ruben Mac as Police Inspector General, Makuei gained notoriety for
engaging in the systematic mistreatment of Equatoria civilians in Juba. Abel's
time in the office was mostly marked by negative political practices, including
nepotism, tribalism, and a sense of entitlement. Additionally, there were
instances of cruelty towards the indigenous communities of Equatoria, which,
among other causes, contributed to the occurrence of Kokora4. The
implementation of the Kokora strategy is considered to be one of the factors
that impacted the formation of the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement
(SPLA/M). Makuei defected from the Sudanese Police forces (SPF) and joined the
SPLA/M in 1983, at the rank of Colonel. He assumed the position of the first
Inspector General (IGP) of the Southern Sudan Police Services (SSPS) in 2005
and served until 2010.
2. General David Aguer was appointed as the deputy to Deng by Kiir.
General Aguer is a member of the Anyuak ethnic group from Pachala in Jonglei
State. Gen. Ageur completed his law enforcement education at the Police Academy
in Sudan as part of cohort 35. General Aguer held the position of the inaugural
Assistant Commissioner General of Police (SSACGP) in Juba, representing the
southern region of Sudan. During the Post Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
in 2005, he, along with other high-ranking Southern Sudanese officers, was
assigned to Juba with the objective of establishing the Southern Sudan Police
Service (SSPS). Moreover, David was responsible for overseeing the SSPS
recruitment service. General Aguer held many positions at both the state and
national levels. He formerly held the position of First Assistant Commissioner
General of Police in Sudan and has also served as a Minister. During the era of decentralization in 1983, he
was two terms Province Commissioner in Upper Nile region. Currently, he is
a Member of Parliament (MP) in Juba and served as
Chair for Defence and Security Committee. General Aguer is the sole individual of
non-Dinka/Nuer ethnicity to have held a prominent position within the South
Sudanese People's Security Services.
3. Gen. Achuil Tito Manawoly is a member of the Dinka ethnic group
from the Kwac village in Warrap state. Achuil was a member of the 42nd cohort
of the Sudanese Police Academy in Khartoum. In 1983, he became a member of
SPLA/M. He held the position of Second IGP, serving from 2009 to 2013. Achuil's
tenure was marked by a significant prevalence of corruption, nepotism,
tribalism, and the unjustified elevation of unqualified individuals selected
from the Achuil Boys Club5 roster. The non
active list was late Achuils’ innovation and it is unconstitutional, unlawful
and nowhere to be seen in the SSP Act and Regulations of 2009 or police policy.
4. Gen. Gordon Kur Micha deputized Late Achuil. General Micha is a
member of the Dinka Bor ethnic group, which is located in Jonglei State. Gordon
completed his law enforcement studies at the Sudanese Police Academy in
Khartoum as part of cohort 42, rather than being affiliated with the SPLA. In
1989, he was expelled for reasons related to the public welfare by the Khartoum
regime of National Islamic Front (NIF). During the early 1990s, he
sought asylum in the Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE) and was subsequently
relocated to Ottawa, Canada. Following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),
he repatriated to Sudan and was reinstated to the South Sudanese Police Service
(SSPS) with the rank of Brigadier General in 2007. His tenure was from 2010 until
2013.
5. Gen. Pieng Deng Kuol is a member of the Dinka Ngok ethnic group in
Abeyi. Pieng is the sibling of Dr. Francis Deng, Dr. Biong, and Deng Alor.
Pieng lacks the credentials of a Sudanese Police Academy graduate and possesses
no expertise in the field of police. He enrolled as an engineering student at
Khartoum University in Sudan, but did not finish and became a member of the
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) at the beginning of 1983. Pieng held many
positions, including the role of deputy Chief of General Staff for finance and
administration in the South Sudan People's Army (SPLA). Pieng held the position
of the Third Inspector General of Police (IGP) from 2013 to 2016.
6. General Andrew Kuol Nyon was appointed as a deputy to Pieng by
Kiir. General Nyon is a member of the Dinka Bor ethnic group in Jonglei State.
General Kuol obtained his law enforcement certification from the Sudanese
Police Academy in Khartoum as part of the 47th cohort. General Kuol joined the
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) right after graduation from
Police Academy with rank of 2Lt. He is presently in
charge of the small weapons division.
7. Gen. Makur Maroul is a member of the Dinka ethnic group from
Cuiebeit in Lakes State. Makur completed his law enforcement studies at the
Sudanese Police Academy in Khartoum as part of the 42nd batch. Makur was one of
the Southern Sudanese Officers who were relocated from the Police headquarters
in Khartoum to Juba under the direction of Gen. Aguer in order to form the
Southern Sudanese Police Service (SSPS). He is a person with privileged access
and held the position for duration of barely nine months. Makur was handpicked from retirees list by Kiir and appointed as the Inspector General of Police (IGP) from a group of
Dinka officers in the SSPS. He held the position of the Fourth and served a
term of nine months in office.
8. Gen. James Beil is member of Nuer ethnic group from Unity State and was appointed by Kiir as a deputy to
Makur. He is affiliated with the SPLA-IO group led by Taban Deng.
9. Gen. Saeed Chawul Lom is a member of the Dinka ethnic group from
Rumbek in Lakes State. He has successfully completed the Police academy studies
in Sudan as part of cohort 47. He was terminated on two occasions while serving
as Captain and LCol by the Khartoum regime. While he was in office, there was
an allegation that the stolen United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
vehicle was discovered at his residence in Juba. Like the last
Inspector General of Police (IGP), Saeed was personally handpicked from retirees list by Kiir and
officially installed as the IGP. Saeed served as the Fifth Inspector General of
Police (IGP) for duration of nine months
10.General James Pio is a member of Nuer ethnic group from
Unity State was appointed by Kiir as a deputy to Saeed. The Nuer General is
affiliated with the SPLA-IO group led by General Taban Deng.
11. Gen. Majak Akech Malok
is a member of the Dinka ethnic group from Lakes State. He is SPLA officer;
however, he did not attend the Sudanese Police Academy in Khartoum and lacks
any expertise or understanding in the field of police. At first, Majak had the
rank of Captain, then Late Achuil elevated him to the rank of Lieutenant
Colonel. In a little span of time, he swiftly ascended by Kiir to the rank of
Lieutenant General and assumed the role of Director General of the Civil
Registry Nationalities, Passports, and Immigration Directorate. He is a member
of the Achuil Corrupt Boys Club (aka Sgt Boys). He is the sibling of Paul Mayoum
Akech, who previously served as a Minister and Member of Parliament.
12. General Jal Thomas was
appointed deputy to Majak by Kiir. General Thomas is a member of the Nuer
ethnic group in Unity State. Gen. Thomas is an alumnus of the Sudanese Police Academy
in Khartoum and has obtained a Master's degree in Peace studies from the
University of Juba. Gen. Thomas is affiliated with the SPLA/IO side led by Dr.
Riak Machar.
13. Gen. Atem Morol Biar is
a member of the Dinka Bor ethnic group in Jonglei State. He is an SPLA soldier
without education, training, and expertise in law enforcement. He is a member
of the recently Achui Corrupt Boys Club (aka Sgt Boys). Late Achuil recommended
him, and Kiir advanced him from the rank of Colonel to Major General, along
with several others. Prior to this, he held the position of Director General at
the Directorate of Civil Registry, Nationality Passports, and Immigration
within the Interior Ministry.
TABLES
|
NO.
|
RANK/ NAME
|
STATE
|
ETHNICITY
|
BACKGROUND
|
REMARKS
|
|
1.
|
Gen.
Makuei Deng
|
Jonglei
|
Dinka
|
Anya
Nya/ SPLA
|
|
|
2.
|
Late Gen. Acuil Tito Madut
|
Warrap
|
Dinka
|
Police Academy/ & SPLA
|
|
|
3.
|
Gen. Pieng Deng Kuol
|
Abyei
|
Dinka
|
SPLA/
not a Police Academy graduate
|
|
|
4.
|
Gen.Makur Maroul
|
Lakes
|
Dinka
|
Graduate of Police Academy
|
|
|
5.
|
Gen. Saeed Chawul Lom
|
Lakes
|
Dinka
|
Graduate of Police Academy
|
|
|
6.
|
Gen. Majak Akech Malok
|
Lakes
|
Dinka
|
SPLA/
not a Police Academy graduate
|
|
|
7.
|
Gen.
Atem Morol Biar
|
Jonglei
|
Dinka
|
SPLA/
not a Police Academy graduate
|
|
|
NO.
|
RANK/ NAME
|
STATE
|
ETHNICITY
|
BACKGROUND
|
REMARKS
|
|
1.
|
Gen.
David Aguer
|
Jonglei
|
Anyuak
|
Graduate
of Police Academy
|
The
only non-Dinka/Nuer served in the higher portfolio of the SSNPS.
|
|
2.
|
Gen. Gordon Kur Micha
|
Jonglei
|
Dinka
|
Police Academy/ SPLA/non SPLA
|
|
|
3.
|
Gen. Andrew Kual Nyon
|
Jonglei
|
Dinka
|
Graduate of Police Academy &
SPLA
|
|
|
4.
|
Gen. James Biel
|
Unity
|
Nuer
|
IO
|
|
|
5.
|
Gen. James Pio
|
Unity
|
Nuer
|
IO
|
|
|
6.
|
Gen. Jal Thomas
|
Unity
|
Nuer
|
Graduate of Police Academy &
SPLA/IO
|
|
|
7.
|
Gen. Jal Thomas
|
Unity
|
Nuer
|
Graduate of Police Academy &
SPLA/IO
|
|
DATA
DON’T LIE
LIST
OF IGPs BY STATE (2023)
|
State
|
CES
|
EES
|
WES
|
JS
|
Unity
|
UN
|
LS
|
WS
|
WBG
|
NBG
|
ABYEI
|
|
No
of IGPs
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
|
Percentage
%
|
0%
|
0%
|
0%
|
28.5%
|
0%
|
0%
|
42.8%
|
14%
|
0%
|
0%
|
14.2%
|
*Jonglei one, Lakes
three, Warrap one, and Abeyi one.
LIST
OF DEPUTY IGPs BY STATE (2023)
|
State
|
CES
|
EES
|
WES
|
JS
|
Unity
|
UN
|
LS
|
WS
|
WBG
|
NBG
|
ABYEI
|
|
No
of IGPs
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
4
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
|
Percentage
%
|
0%
|
0%
|
0%
|
43%
|
57.1%
|
0%
|
0%
|
0%
|
0%
|
0%
|
0%
|
*One non-Dinka/Nuer, two
Dinkas, and three Nuers
LIST
OF IGPS BY PERCENTAGE (2023)
|
Item
|
Female
|
Male
|
Remarks
|
|
No.
|
0
|
7
|
N/A
|
|
Percentage %
|
0%
|
100%
|
N/A
|
*Seven
out of seven Dinka
LIST
OF IGP & DEPUTY IGPS BY GENDER (2023)
|
Item
|
Female
|
Male
|
Remarks
|
|
No.
|
0
|
7
|
N/A
|
|
Percentage %
|
0%
|
100%
|
N/A
|
*Zero female and seven male
LIST
OF IGPs & DEPUTY IGPS BY ETHNICITIES (2023)
|
No.
|
Ethnicity
|
No
of IGP/DIGP
|
Percentage
%
|
No.
|
Ethnicity
|
No
of IGP/DIGP
|
Percentage
%
|
|
1.
|
Acholi
|
0
|
0%
|
39.
|
Makaraka
|
0
|
0%
|
|
2.
|
Aja
|
0
|
0%
|
40.
|
Mananger
|
0
|
0%
|
|
3.
|
Anyuak
(D/IGP)
|
1
|
14.2%
|
41.
|
Mangayat
|
0
|
0%
|
|
4.
|
Atuot
(Reel)
|
0
|
0%
|
42.
|
Muru
|
0
|
0%
|
|
5.
|
Avukaya
|
0
|
0%
|
43.
|
Moro
Kodo
|
0
|
0%
|
|
6.
|
Azande
|
0
|
0%
|
44.
|
Mundari
|
0
|
0%
|
|
7.
|
Bai
|
0
|
0%
|
45.
|
Mundu
|
0
|
0%
|
|
8.
|
Baka
|
0
|
0%
|
46.
|
Murle
|
0
|
0%
|
|
9.
|
Balanda-Boor
|
0
|
0%
|
47
|
Ndogo
|
0
|
0%
|
|
10.
|
Balanda-
Viri
|
0
|
0%
|
48.
|
Ngulngule
|
0
|
0%
|
|
11.
|
Banda
|
0
|
0%
|
49.
|
Nuer
(D/IGP)
|
4
|
57.1%
|
|
12.
|
Bari
|
0
|
0%
|
50.
|
Nyangatom
|
0
|
0%
|
|
13.
|
Binga
|
0
|
0%
|
51.
|
Yangwara
|
0
|
0%
|
|
14.
|
Bongo
|
0
|
0%
|
52.
|
Otuho
|
0
|
0%
|
|
15.
|
Boya
(Larim is their village)
|
0
|
0%
|
53.
|
Pari
|
0
|
0%
|
|
16.
|
Didinga
|
0
|
0%
|
54.
|
Pojulu
|
0
|
0%
|
|
17.
|
Dinka
Dinka
|
7
IGP
2
D/IGP
|
100%
28.5%
|
55.
|
Sere
|
0
|
0%
|
|
18.
|
Dongatona
|
0
|
0%
|
56.
|
Shaaya
|
0
|
0%
|
|
19.
|
Falata
(Arab Nomads)
|
0
|
0%
|
57.
|
Shilluk
(Chollo)
|
0
|
0%
|
|
20.
|
Feroghe
|
0
|
0%
|
58.
|
Suri
(Kachipo)
|
0
|
0%
|
|
21.
|
Collo
|
0
|
0%
|
59.
|
Tid
|
0
|
0%
|
|
22.
|
Horiok/
Horyok
|
0
|
0%
|
60.
|
Toposa
|
0
|
0%
|
|
23.
|
Indri
|
0
|
0%
|
61..
|
Uduk
|
0
|
0%
|
|
24.
|
Jiye
(Jie)
|
0
|
0%
|
62.
|
Woro
|
0
|
0%
|
|
25.
|
Jur
(Bell & Modo)
|
0
|
0%
|
63.
|
Yulu
|
0
|
0%
|
|
26.
|
Jurchol
|
0
|
0%
|
64.
|
|
0
|
0%
|
|
27..
|
Kakwa
|
0
|
0%
|
|
|
|
|
|
28.
|
Kara
|
0
|
0%
|
|
|
|
|
|
29.
|
Keliku
|
0
|
0%
|
.
|
|
|
|
|
30.
|
Kresh
|
0
|
0%
|
|
|
|
|
|
32.
|
Kuku
|
0
|
0%
|
|
|
|
|
|
33.
|
Lango
|
0
|
0%
|
|
|
|
|
|
34.
|
Lopit
|
0
|
0%
|
|
|
|
|
|
35.
|
Lugbwara
|
0
|
0%
|
|
|
|
|
|
36.
|
Lolubo
|
0
|
0%
|
|
|
|
|
|
37.
|
Maban
|
0
|
0%
|
|
|
|
|
|
38.
|
Ma’adi
|
0
|
0%
|
|
|
|
|
THE LIST IS INCOMPLETE
2023
*One Anyuak, two Dinkas, and four Nuers
Endnotes:
1. Equatoria house
niggers (EHN) refer to some public officials in the Central Equatoria, Eastern
Equatoria, and Western Equatoria administrations who are recognized for their
involvement in the illicit sale of government residences, lands, assets, and
natural resources to individuals or groups that pose a threat to the interests
of South Sudan. They occupy influential positions inside the CE government,
Ministry of Housing, Land Commission, Equatoria Members of Parliament at the
national and state levels, as well as within the Court and local Chiefs
offices.
2. Arua boys is a
collective of exiles from CES, with some of them having never seen Juba before
2005. During the conflict, they were refugees’ individuals seeking safety in
Uganda. They were known as the Arua Boys and were often spotted at Arua Park,
which served as a hub for gatherings, commerce, and occasionally, aimless
wandering. At present, some of Arua boys have hijacked and taken control of the
CE government key positions. They engage in illicit displacement of legitimate
landowners in Juba, utilizing their positions of authority to coerce and
instill fear, resulting in the targeted killing of vulnerable women in Juba.
For further information, please refer to the live video by Michael Christopher
on Facebook, broadcasted on August 6, 2023.
3. The Anyanya were a
faction of separatist rebels in Southern Sudan that emerged during the initial
phase of the First Sudanese Civil War. Another distinct movement that emerged
during the Second Sudanese Civil War was SPLA.
4. Kokora is
synonymous with the act of dividing. Kokora is a term used in the Karo language.
The Karo-speaking ethnic group is located in the Central Equatoria region. The
ethnic groups include Bari, Mandari, Nyangwara, Kuku, Kakwa, and Pojulu. Kokora
is a term that denotes the act of dividing or the concept of division. For
example, if you possess a single loaf of bread and have two offspring, what
actions would you take to ensure fairness? Divide it evenly by giving one to
each youngster, breaking it in the middle. Socially, equity refers to the fair
and equitable distribution of resources, while in governance; it denotes the
allocation of power among different levels of governments.
5. The Achuil Boys
Club, often known as the Sgt boys, is a collective of young officers who are
affiliated with the late General Achuil.
REFERENCES
1. Administrative Corruption,
Nepotism, Injustice and Discrimination in South Sudan: Retrieved from
- Presidential Decrees copies
- State Police:
Retrieved from https://www.allcriminaljusticeschools.com/law-enforcement/
on Dec 3, 2023
5. The COPS 2014: Retrieved from www.cops.usdoj.gov, on Nov 23th, 2023;
6. The illegal removal and land
grabbing in Jabal Nogka in Juba: Retrieved from https://fb.watch/oHAn-I5EvB/?mibextid=2Rb1fB on Aug 6,2023 and
ANNEX
- BREAKING
NEWS
Gen.
Atem Marol Biar who was appointed yesterday through Presidential decree as
Inspector General of South Sudan National Police Service has been in a
land-grabbing battle fighting the vulnerable and powerless widow who has been
occupant of the land for more than 37 years since 1986.
Yesterday
at around 3 PM without following the rightful legal procedure of land
ownership, he started ramming down the building. It was raining and the
children were beaten, chased out by the hungry hired police goons. Now that he
has powers to kill and loot, the life of the poor widow shall be in absolute
danger unless she surrenders ownership of the land.
Gen.
Atem Marol started claiming the land in 2018. After he was appointed the DG of
DCRNPI, he bribed the Central Equatoria Ministry of Land and Housing and the
court specifically the people who are presiding over the case. He doesn't have
the original document of the land; sometimes he swerved the court hearing on
the pretext of a busy schedule.
Surprisingly
this morning, the chief of the area Sultan Michael Loku Legge who has been
siding with the widow was arrested and taken to unknown destination.
The
land being battled is in Thongping along the American residence road, down to
the Turkey embassy (sources: unknown).
- What are The
Difference between Local, State, and Federal Law Enforcement?
Primarily,
the difference between local, state, and federal law enforcement officials is
who they work for and their jurisdiction. For instance, state-level officials
work for a state agency and enforce state laws, but have no jurisdiction in
federal matters; local sheriffs or police officers work for municipalities and
enforce local and state laws within that municipality, but generally have no
jurisdiction outside of that area.
Local
law enforcement agencies, such as municipal, county, tribal, and regional
police forces, derive authority from the local governing body. Their primary
objective is to uphold and enforce the laws within their jurisdiction. These
agencies play a crucial role in providing patrol services and conducting
investigations to address local crimes effectively.
Municipal
law enforcement
In towns and
cities, police officers will patrol streets by car or highway, provides traffic
assistance, and respond to emergencies and calls for help, and maintain peace
and security. If a crime occurs, they may investigate, interview people, and
apprehend suspects. They also testify in court. Police detectives concentrate
on investigations, while crime scene investigators are charged with gathering
and analyzing evidence.
Some municipal
police also provide protection for parks, public transportation, and local
rivers and lakes, but in larger cities, these duties are often performed by
specialized police units. Some sworn officers are employed as private police
for schools, universities, or hospitals.
County
Law Enforcement
All but three
states (Alaska, Hawaii, and Connecticut) have law enforcement that work on the
county level, but their jurisdictions and duties vary widely. They may perform
full police functions, including investigations, in rural areas outside of
towns and cities. Or, they may patrol county roads and assist in traffic
control, serve summons and eviction notices, transport prisoners, or provide
security at county courthouses or corrections facilities.
A
handful of states have constables. They may be elected officials with limited
duties, or employed as full-duty officers.
State
Law Enforcement
Specific
duties of state-level law enforcement officials differ from state to state. All
states have officers that enforce traffic laws and keep roadways safe. These
are usually called troopers or highway patrol officers. However, in some
states, there is a difference between a state police officer and a highway
patrolman. For example, in California, the job of policing highways and
roads falls to the California Highway Patrol. Investigating statewide
crimes is the job of the California Bureau of Investigation. In other states,
the state police department will provide services for both highway patrol and
crime investigation.
Fish and game
wardens or conservation officers are also generally employed on the state
level. They monitor the safe and legal usage of public parks, waterways,
forests, and open areas. They may enforce hunting and fishing laws, investigate
crimes, and respond to emergencies.
Federal
Law Enforcement
Federal law
enforcement agents serve in many capacities, from providing security for
federal buildings and elected officials to investigating federal crimes and
responding to terrorist attacks.
Cyber
Officers
Cyber policing
is a fast-growing field of law enforcement. It operates mainly on the federal
level, but local and state police do use digital technology to some extent.
“Cybercrime is
under reported,” says Markovic. “If somebody hacks your computer, you don’t
usually call the police.”
However, if
the crime takes place on a major scale, such as data breach or ransomware
attack, cyber police get involved, Markovic says. On the local and state
levels, specialized police officers do use computer technology to detect and
investigate crimes and suspects.
Becoming a
cyber specialist or forensic computer analyst requires knowledge of technology
and a college degree. Like any job in law enforcement, you will be required to
attend a police
training facility and undergo
a background check.
Forensic
computer specialists are also employed by private firms, Markovic states.
Peace
Officer
In
most cases, the term “peace officer” is used interchangeably with “police
officer,” since police consider their main objective to be keeping the peace.
This can be confusing because in a few places across the country, “peace officer” refers to an officer who has limited duties.
Some states refer to this role as auxiliary or reserve officer. Non-sworn peace
officers may be employed, appointed, or elected.
Some
assignments of designated peace officers differ greatly but may include:
·
Security duties
·
Traffic and crowd control
·
Working in correctional facilities
·
Assisting with search and rescue
operations, and
·
Assisting police officers with
designated duties
Sources: All Criminal Justice Schools
About the author
© Hüstin Läkü, Sr., is
a native South Sudanese who was educated in South Sudan, Sudan, Egypt, Germany,
and Switzerland. Läkü,
Sr., is a graduate of Institute of
Federalism, University of Fribourg in Switzerland
His
current research topic is Evaluating South Sudan Governance: From the Perspective
of Federated Forms and Devolution; South Sudan Governance: A Call for Federalism to Address,
Marginalization and Prevent Armed Conflict Recurrence; South Sudan: Institutionalized Discrimination in
Organized Forces and Public Services (Part 2); Administrative Corruption,
Nepotism, Injustice, and Discrimination in South Sudan (Part 1); The Tribal
Police Force in South Sudan; SPLA Versus Khartoum Regimes: Animal Farm Carbon
Copies; and the Politics of Foreign Aid-The Myth of International Aid in
Africa. Deep-rooted conflict, community mediation, facilitation, and leadership
training are areas of interest in my research. Furthermore, Hüstin has given
lectures on Sudanese topics in the United States, Canadian universities, the
Canadian Military Academy in Kingston, Rome, Berlin, Innsbruck, Geneva, and
Slovenia. Hüstin is the recipient of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr's life time
Dream keeper.
