Thursday, November 18, 2010

The Politics and Practices of the Common Enemy of the South Sudan

The situation of "a common enemy" for the people of the Equatoria state in South Sudan reminds me of a story I first read in the book Politics of Self-Reliance in Africa. The story is titled "the Gentleman of the Jungle". You may already know the story very well. I will, however, briefly recite it for the benefit of those who have not heard it before or just to refresh your memory:

According to this story, the Gentleman of the Jungle is the lion. One day a man is seated, relaxing inside his house. The lion says to the man "it is so cold outside here, can I just let my head in the house." Of course, the man allows first, the lion's head into the house, followed by the shoulder, and then front legs. When the lion completely inside, it says to the man "there is not enough room for you and me in the house, get out!" The man who owns the house is thrown out and the lion takes over the house. This story is interesting because it is the lion who now determines the fate of the house once inside rather than the man who built.

The story of the man and the lion is exactly what is happening to the indigenous people of the Equatoria state of south Sudan. During the war the regime of Khartoum soldiers forced the Southern Sudanese to vacate their lands and flee into other regions, urban centres or to the neighbouring countries as refugees as well as internal displaced persons (IDP). As the war was initially dominated by the Dinka, they were the first to be displaced from their regions, and they moved south to the Equatoria state, displacing the Equatorians who were forced to flee to the urban centres or to the neighbouring countries.

In the process of settling the villages vacated, both the Arabs renamed equatorial's cities they occupied and the Dinka's also renamed these places using their own names.

The problem with this issue is that it may become very divisive for southern Sudanese. Instead of a "common enemy" for the southern Sudan, the Dinka and the Khartoum regime have become the common enemy for the Equatorians. It is obvious that the Dinka renamed the villages using their own names because they felt these reminded them of their old villages they left behind. This is not difficult to comprehend since the feeling of "home" is very important as the homestead is a person's base. Unfortunately, what the Dinka and those who are following the Khartoum regime are doing is that they are not only alienating the Equatorians from their total environment, but also sowing seeds of discord among the people of south Sudan. For example, Juba is the base, and homestead for Equatorians, and their way of life. Now, they are being forced out of this city where they have attachment for economic, political, cultural, and religious reasons for ages.

The Khartoum regime did not bring armies from north of Sudan, but recruited the soldiers from the local population as a result of the divisions that exist among the Southern Sudanese. The Khartoum regime has helped set community against community, state against state, and clan against clan. Instead of uniting and focusing on one common southern Sudan enemy, the Dinka have helped empower the Khartoum regime over all the spheres of the local community. In other words, the Khartoum regime is now using Southerners to oppress themselves.

In my view, one of the most serious results of Khartoum regime and its followers within SPLA/M was to alienate Equatorians from political power and their cultural environments. You can see that all the ministers, ambassadors and high ranking officials of the government of South Sudan (GOSS) are mainly from one tribe or one state, in other word there is no equal representation of all the Southerners in the GOSS.

To alienate Equatorians from their political and cultural way is to deprive them from their power base. Alienation from one's environment brings the disease that be could call "not knowing oneself"

In my view as Equatorians, we should not hide our heads in the sand like an ostrich and pretend that there is no problem or that we can solve the problems of the 150,000 Dinkas in Yei by importing other tribes from their base, and homestead, and settle them in Equatorial State (Yei city). We should address this problem head-on. It was the Equatorians who fought back one year ago when Dr. John Garang was killed in a plane crash. The whole world witnessed the burning of northerners' shops in Juba, but not in Malakal, and Wau. Equatorians should think twice why Juba is to be the capital of the South Sudan government or otherwise Equatorians will become victims of CPA? Also, the lack of leadership in Equatorial is number one problem in Equatorial State; some one must stand up against and make the injustice visible.

By Justin Laku ©

Will the Peace Hold in Southern Sudan after the passing of Dr. John Garang?

The roots of the conflict in the Sudan goes back to the early 19th century, several decades before the advent of the Western colonialism in the Sudan; which makes it one the longest wars in the world after the Israeli- Palestine war.
Also, the war in the Southern Sudan, between the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the National Islamic fundamentalism (NIF) in Khartoum is among Africa’s oldest and deadliest conflicts and largest in the region. More then 3 million were killed, achieving a death toll over twenty times higher than Darfur’s do date.
The NIF viewed the CPA as an opportunity to direct the international community’s attention away from their ongoing genocide in Darfur. While they have made some cosmetic changes, the NIF hasn’t fulfilled their core obligations to the CPA and don’t appear any more committed to this peace agreement than to any of the other treaties they’ve signed. In fact the NIF has put enormous obstacles in place to prevent progress on the CPA. It seems clear the NIF has no intention of sharing either power or oil revenue with the SPLA.
On the one hand it is impossible for the SPLA or the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGDA) to know if the NIF is sharing oil revenues according to the dictates of the CPA because the NIF won’t disclose what the total revenues are. It is also likely that the NIF will use oil money to manipulate voting in the upcoming referendum on separation, which will take place in six years time.
The NIF’s continued support for the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda is another problem calling the success of the CPA into question. How could the LRA cross the east side of the river to west, without the logistical support of the NIF? Yei is the only source of food to the population in Juba and most of the Arab trades are not happy that food should come from Yei, because it will have negative impact on their business in Juba.
As know you the recent attacked on the convey in early September between Juba and Yei, the NIF is behind it. How could (LRA) cross the east side of the river to west, without the logistic support of the NIF? Yei is the only source of food to Juba population and most of the Arab trades are not happy that the food should come from Yei, because it will have negative impact on their business in Juba.
The United Nation Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), could have prevented the recent attack in Yei-Juba road, but the 700 UNMIS peacekeeping troops are based only in Juba unarmed and mostly allied with Khartoum’s regimes and who have large investments in the Sudanese oil sector. Most of the UNMIS peacekeeping troops from Australia, Russia and other European countries are enjoying themselves in Khartoum’s expensive hotels playing cards and smoking cigars instead of patrolling the North / South border.
Besides this, the mandate of United Nation Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) is very weak. They have no power to arrest treaty violators, detain suspects or fight back. This is a repeat of the situation in Darfur and if such attacks continue UNMIS will be as impotent as the AU in that region.
Furthermore, the NIF has not disclosed the number of troops it still has in Southern Sudan to the UNMIS, either in Juba or other part of Southern Sudan.
Added to this hostile elements are the 500,000 Janjaweed with their horses, women and children that the NIF relocated from Darfur to Rokon County, about 60 miles south west of Juba. Their presence tends to indicate that the NIF intends to unleash a campaign of atrocities on Rokon County similar to the one they have in Darfur.
Another tactic the NIF is using to destabilize South Sudan is the transfer of large numbers of Egyptian Arabs to that region. This is in keeping with their policy of Arabizing Sudan and the implementation of this policy is what leads to the violence in Darfur.
The NIF encourages immigration from Egypt by offering these migrants the following rights: freedom of entry to Sudan without visas; residence permits are provided free of cost; freedom of movement within the whole of Sudan; the ability to own land upon arrival; the right to vote as soon as they settle in Sudan.
All of this is going on while tens of thousands of Sudanese languish in Egypt in deplorable conditions with none of the aforementioned privileges. Nineteen thousand are registered with the UNHCR, but there are many more Sudanese stranded in Egypt, unable to return to Sudan.
The strategy is obvious; the Arabs are being relocated in the south while African Southerners are being kept from returning in an attempt to shift the demographic to favour Khartoum when the vote for independence comes in 2011.
The abuse of South Sudanese is not restricted to Egypt. There are countless Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) living in Khartoum or in the IDP camps around it such as Hagi Yousif , Kalakata and Al-Sal’ama Camp in Jebel.
Since the death of Garang the dumping of five to ten bodies of South Sudanese has become a daily occurrence. Those who had managed to scrape together enough to escape the IDP camps and eke out a living in Khartoum are being driven from their homes once again by landlords who are increasing rents by as much as 100%. Whole families are being driven back into the camps straining what resources are available there.
In another effort to keep Southerners from returning home the NIF has increased air fare from Khartoum to Juba from $100, to $200.
These are just a few of the tactics implemented by the NIF to insure the CPA fails. It is up to the international community to monitor these violations and, more importantly, insure there are very real and very negative consequences for such abuse. Only through this type of foreign intervention will the NIF be made to respect their obligations under the CPA and implement it fully without delay.

By Justin Laku©

Fraught Sudan poll imperils democracy

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