Tuesday, February 13, 2018

Major Problems in the United Nations Civilian Protection Sites (POCs) in South Sudan and the Refugees Camps in Borders

Major Problems in the United Nations Civilian Protection Sites (POCs) in South Sudan and the Refugee Camps on the Borders

ABSTRACT

 

This paper examines the persistent challenges facing the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in protecting civilians—particularly women and children—from sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in and around the Protection of Civilians (POC) sites and border refugee camps. Despite the UN’s “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) mandate, widespread abuses—including gang rape, abduction, and targeted killings—continue to occur with impunity. The study identifies structural failures in R2P implementation, inadequate humanitarian coordination, and flawed aid distribution mechanisms that expose displaced women to further harm. It argues that UNMISS must transition from a passive posture to a proactive, gender-sensitive protection strategy that integrates security patrols, community engagement, and survivor-centered medical and psychosocial support. Drawing on field reports, testimonies, and comparative lessons from Darfur, this paper provides practical recommendations for improving the safety of internally displaced persons (IDPs) within POC sites and enhancing the role of regional forces in safeguarding refugees. Ultimately, it calls for a re-examination of UNMISS’s operational mandate and accountability mechanisms to restore the credibility of international protection efforts in South Sudan.

Major Problems in the United Nations Civilian Protection Sites (POCs) in South Sudan and the Refugees Camps in Borders

The paper discusses the Causes of Sexual Gender Based Violence (SGBV), gang rape outside the United Nations Protection (UNPOCs) sites in South Sudan; and refugee camps on the borders. It also explains R2P failure, humanitarian delivery aid mechanisms and the negative impact of Aid Distributions (do no harm) on lives of women and children and failure to meet the needs of women in particular. It explores workable concrete solutions to prevent (SGBV), gang rape crimes as well as provides the UN peacekeeping force in country with some ideas how to protect IDPs in POCs, which could reduce (SGBV) in the current political and humanitarian crisis in South Sudan. In addition to this, its addresses the role regional forces can play to protect Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) in UNPOC Sites in South Sudan as well as refugee camps outside South Sudan.

The paper does not go into the question of SGBV within the UNPOCs or sites and the refugee camps. It seems the major problem is outside the POCs sites, and it draws conclusions with recommendations.

It argues that, it is time for United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to move from an inactive stance and face its failure to protect civilians; reexamine critically its culture of report writing, its system of distributions of solid food aid; its ignoring the need for distributing firewood or providing solar cooking stoves; its inadequate medical centres for (SGBV) victims; and the logistical gaps that affect the investigative body with the mandate to document (SGBV) crimes and preserve evidences for future persecutions, namely the Human Rights Commissioners (OHCHR, 2017).  The paper commences with (SGBV).

The other issue is the culture of reporting within the UN system. The culture of reporting has never yielded substantive results on the ground as well as improves safety of women IDPs in both Darfur camps and POCs in both Sudans.

There were many reports and cases well documented by the UN investigators that covered SGBV cases, but the situations remained the same and IDPs still in the camps and POCs sites. For example, from July 2016 to January 2017, Human Rights Violations and Abuses report was jointly documented by UNMISS and the OHCHR. The report detailed human rights crimes and violations, and UN system was still inactive and failed to protect IDPs.

The Human Rights Commission was established under the auspices of the United Nations with mandate to monitor, investigate, verify and report on abuses, violations of human rights, violations of International humanitarian law and the most serious crimes in South Sudan since December 2013 by inter alia collecting and preserving evidences of human rights violations and abuses and violation of international Humanitarian Law and by supporting criminal proceedings before the hybrid court and national, regional and international tribunals with jurisdiction over such crimes (OHCHR 2017), provide protections and safety to POCs populations in South Sudan (UNMISS/OHCHR 2017).

1. The Causes of Sexual Gender Based Violence (SGBV).

 

The frequent SGBV crimes against women, girls and boys around and outside UNPOCs sites and refugee camps are some examples of failure of R2P and the UNMISS. Failure of R2P in poor military protection of civilians specially women victims of gang rape who were caught up in search for firewood and absence of patrolling areas around UNPOCs sites and roads leading to markets. Additionally, it seems that there was lack of positive interactions between IDPs populations in the POCs and peacekeeping forces. The positive interactions is the most important elements of R2P and UNMISS mandate in protection of citizens, vulnerable and defenseless women, young girls and boys who cannot defend themselves in this current civil war. The UNMISS and R2P failed to provide military protection, adequate food, womens’ needs as well as protections of women who ventured outside POCs sites in search of food and firewood and ended up victims of SGBV ang gang rape.

The current rape data collected in South Sudan shows that the youngest patient treated due to rape and several times physical assault was a 5-year-old boy. 33% of patients experienced sexual violence in South Sudan, 23% during the journey to Uganda, 19% at the border areas and 18% in the refugee settlement or reception centres (MSF Report 2017).

Below are stories of gang rape-

Adot sought shelter at the POC site in Malakal UNMISS base on 24 December 2013. One morning a few days later, she left the base to collect firewood. When she was on her way back, and only a short distance from the base, four Nuer SPLA-IO soldiers attacked her.

“I saw four soldiers coming towards me. I tried to run but they told me they would shoot me if I ran… They asked me if my husband was alive. I did not reply. Then they told me to undress myself and to lay down. I refused and they started beating me with sticks. I realized that they were going to kill me if I continued resisting, so I undressed and laid down. Two of them held my legs and they told one of the others to put a stick into my vagina. So the soldier penetrated my vagina with a stick and I started bleeding immediately. I was brought back to the POC by women who also came to collect firewood. I was admitted in the hospital and stayed there for seven days.” (Amnesty International 2017: p.g27).

Seven government soldiers gang raped Nyabang on 20 July 2017 when she left the Juba POC site, intending to collect food from the World Food Programme warehouse on Yei Road, which she heard had been looted.

She recounted the words of her attackers:

“They spoke to me in Dinka, saying that I must be a Nuer woman. They told me, ‘You woman from Dr. Riek supporters…we are going to show you today. We are going to rape you and you will produce our kids through your vagina, your anus and your mouth’… all of them raped me… they penetrated my vagina, anus and even they inserted their penises inside my mouth… They raped me simply because I am a Nuer… They told me I should blame Dr. Riek Machar for what happened to me (ibid: p.g:36).

Nyabang told researchers that a military sergeant participated in gang raping her, along with six other soldiers, until she fell unconscious. His only instruction was that his subordinates should only rape her vaginally. She recounted, “He [the sergeant] ordered them saying, ‘Stop raping her through her anus, please use her vagina’. After that they decided to use my vagina (ibid: p.g. 37).

Some of the Nuer women attacked along Yei Road were abducted by government soldiers. On 27 July, Nyamachar made the difficult decision to leave the POC and go to the market.

“We [myself and other women] knew that it was very dangerous for Nuer women and men to move outside the PoCs for fear of being raped and killed. But for us women, we just closed our eyes to save our children from starvation. Our children were really dying of hunger in the POCs because we spent many days without food. Since the war broke out in July, the UN had never distributed food.”

On her way back from the market, Nyamachar encountered a large group of armed soldiers at the Yei Road checkpoint. One soldier forced her to enter his car and took her to a government military camp outside of Juba.

“He pushed me into the car and I was driven off … When we reached [the military camp], this soldier took me inside his room and raped me many times. He raped me immediately when we arrived, again after one hour, and again in the middle of the night. The following day, I discovered that there were some other Nuer women that they kept…as sex slaves…I stayed with this soldier for three days…[then] he called another soldier to come and rape me. This soldier raped me five times before they released me.”  Nyamachar said she spent approximately one week held in the military camp (ibid:p.g. 37).

Recently an attack in Juba, the capital city, was reported widely. Organized forces in military uniforms used color of their authority to rob, rape, and kill women, girls, boys and men in the day light and at night. On Oct 13th, in the absent of R2P in Juba, SPLA soldiers’ gang raped two young girls in Juba Muniki residential areas (News & Politics, Oct, 2017). It is safe to say that even non-IDP civilians in major cities have difficulties getting, finding and buying charcoal and food and fall prey to violence in overcoming these difficulties.

2-R2P Failure

My position is that these cases of rape as described above could have been prevented if the R2P had been effective and efficient. Let us begin with what R2P elements are. It has become part of the mandate of UN peace keeping troops in South Sudan, where it was first initiated.

The UNMISS Mandate on peace keeping and protection

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2155 (2014) of May 27th, 2014 mandated 12,500 UNMISS peacekeeping forces to protect civilians; monitoring and investigating human rights; creating the conditions for delivery of humanitarian assistance and supporting the implementation of “the 2014 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoH)”.

The protection of civilians clauses (I), (II) and (V) state the following: To protect civilians under threat of physical violence, irrespective of the source of such violence, within its capacity and areas of deployment, with specific protection for women and children, including the continued use of the Mission’s child protection and women’s protection advisers; and to deter violence against civilians, including foreign nationals, especially through proactive deployment, active patrolling with particular attention to displaced civilians, including those in protection sites and refugee camps, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, and identification of threats and attacks against the civilian population, including through regular interaction with the civilian population and closely with humanitarian, human rights and development organizations, in areas at high risk of conflict including, as appropriate, schools, places of worship, hospitals and the oil installations, in particular when the Government of the Republic of South Sudan is unable or failing to provide such security (UNSC 2014).

Let us look at what the practice is in fact compared to the expectations of the mandate. For example, the current protection practices by the UNMISS constitute daily patrols during the day time in the major cities in South Sudan, cleaning (grabbed collection) of Juba city, directing traffic and pedestrians, teaching locals taekwondo, karate and cricket.2 Such activities to maintain do not serve, even violate, the mandate to protect victims from violence and to save (SGBV) all civilians from victimized by gang rapes carried out by any rebel groups or Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) military and its illegitimate ethnic dinka militants when they go in search of extra food, water and firewood to save their starving children from hunger in the UNPOC sites or refugee camps. Despite even their daylight patrols, the UN troops are unable to prevent the SGBV occurring as described above by actual victims. As there are no night patrols as of yet, though this is being discussed as necessary because of findings of report of the UN in August 2017, any efforts to get food or firewood or water at night are totally unprotected by UN troops. Obviously, this practice reveals even more clearly the ineffectiveness and inefficient of the R2P doctrine.

Thus, in summary the “Elements” of the R2P embrace three temporal phases:

1. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other human-made crises putting populations at risk.

2. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention.

3. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert (Weiss, 2006: p.23).

 

On Nov 11th, 2016, Mr. Adama Dieng, the United Nations envoy on genocide prevention visited Yei city. While in Yei, Mr. Dieng encountered stories of victims of tortures, detentions, and rapes. Among many Yei city’s IDPs population who voluntarily appeared and testified before UN officials was Rev. Lasu. He was later arrested, tortured, murdered by the South Sudan national security (SSNS) agents and his body was found on the Yei –Juba Road. This incident suggests that R2P and UNMISS failed to protect IDPs as well as to provide protection to human rights witness who came forward with information about crimes against humanity. Lacks protections and patrolling have forced many IDPs to leave major cities in South Sudan at a high rate of 3,500 persons per day (UNHCR, 2017).

Lack of protection and safety of witnesses may also, deter many not to come forward with evidence and may not help work of human rights investigative body. This explains the basis of the obligation to report human rights abuses weaknesses of the reporting culture of UNMISS outside the peacekeeping troops who have the mandate to protect, also it raises many questions such as what are the terms of that mandate? What are problems of poor implementation?

The UN relied on the regional body of the African Union (AU) to do similar duties of UN human rights investigative body, and this create duplication of work and AU has its own weaknesses in this field. Additionally, the body set up by the OHCHR and UNMISSES Human Rights to oversee human rights violations, but the body is inactive and cannot guarantee witnesses safety in the country as well as this defeat the overall purpose and mandate of the body. Protecting, and providing safety to witnesses as well as documenting and preserving crimes evidence is the only way victims will have hope in international legal system, will deter rogue government form using their soldier’s contrary to international humanitarian and human rights standards and rebel criminals as well.

 

3. Negative Impact of Aid Distributions on Women and Failure to meet the needs of women in particular

 

Under the R2P mandate the UN troops are to create the conditions for delivery of humanitarian assistance and support the implementation of “the 2014 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement”.

In order to create such conditions, the UN troops must be made aware of why protection has to be designed according to the needs of the civilians being protected and how not fulfilling these needs can expose them to danger and violence. In this regards the food and water culture in South Sudan plays a key role and is a key cause of the SGBV that women, children and boys sufferings from.

Food culture and firewood collection in Sudan and South Sudan are the responsibility of women. Women’s daily activities consist of walking in groups for long distances early each morning and before sunset, during the day and evening to fetch water either from a river, or boreholes that are not near villages. Search for water around water sources are places where women socialize and offer social support to each other.

Water is used for drinking, washing needs, cooking traditional foods known as ugali and Kisra (flatbread), porridge, preparing tea, coffee and heating water for baths. This explains why the culture of preparing food in both Sudans takes more than five hours or so. Furthermore, cooking processes require firewood, and most women in urbanized cities such as Juba, Malakal, Torit and Wau buy charcoal. However, these days, it is very difficult to find, get and buy charcoal and firewood in markets across South Sudan.

The reason is most charcoal, and firewood traders have either left the village or been displaced due to insecurity. Insecurity and population displacement together triggered food and water insecurity.  The insecurity contributed to increased charcoal prices in the markets. For instance, the current price of one sack of charcoal is $2000SSP (average $16US) and before 2013, it was around $20SSP while average employee salary is $300SSP. In addition to this, for many there is no access to the markets at all, even if they could afford high prices, the economy has collapsed, farmers can no longer produce food, and public servants have not been paid for the last ten months or so.

Other factors contributing to rise of charcoal scarcity are most major natural forests are inhabited by different rebel groups and the major producer cities in Equatoria States are controlled by SPLA soldiers and illegitimate ethnic dinka paramilitary of Mathiang Anyor that is carrying on targeted killings of civilians and traders on the roads (Johnson, 2016).

Thus, the issues of food/water availability and insecurity are major contributors to GBV, gang rape and armed attacks on civilians in the UN POC sites and refugee camps.

The aid packages delivered to the civilians in the UNPOC sites do not include standard non-food items such as water, firewood, charcoal, and solar ovens for cooking.

Since charcoal trade is number one factor leading to deforestation in both Sudans, it is ideal that solar ovens can be perfect solution to deforestation.

While the traditional IDP camps or refugee camps make provisions for water and cooking, the POC sites are at a disadvantage. The reason lies in the conditions under which the POC camps were created in South Sudan.

The term POC site is newly invented, and it has entered the humanitarian lexicon after the 2013 political and humanitarian crisis in South Sudan. When conflict broke out between the forces loyal to Dinka President Kiir and those of former Nuer Vice President Machar, violence erupted and led civilians fled their neighborhoods with the hope to take safety at the UNMISS premises in the capital Juba.

When IDPs reached the UNMISS gate, the peacekeeping forces prevented them from entering the UN compound in Tomping west of Juba Airport, but later they were allowed after consultation between NY and UNSGR. This was the first time that IDPs physically ran into UN premises for safety- this was unusual.

Similarly, it was the first time that UNMISS was faced with this situation, without guidance, ill-prepared, did not have contingency plans to receive and deal with needs of thousands of IDPs as well as providing protection for them. The 2013 violence which spread across the country creates new kinds of camps for IDPs, this time on UN premises.

This has generated several predicaments. Other UN agencies and NGOs specialize in dealing with, organizing and managing IDP and refugee camps on sites provided by the national or local government.  They were not called in to manage the situation of IDPs in the UN peacekeeping compounds in South Sudan. To this day there is lack of coordination and communication with such agencies and NGOs. Even some NGOs are baffled, because they have distinct policies about limits to dealing with military troops or working in militarized environment. The dilemmas as how remain unresolved fully even with deployment of additional protection forces.

Another issue that stands out very clearly was the fact that UN forces are not well-trained in the international humanitarian field. They are combat troops with hardly any humanitarian training even in their own national milieus. Combat duty and defensive troop protection as well as civilians took priority and created many problems: no food aid, no water, no protection against SGBV, no management of ethnic tensions within the sites, and lack of policy guidelines on cooperation among the INGOs. For instance, MSF has setup medical centres to treat SGBV in Upper Nile States and this initiative should have been extended to other POC sites in Equatoria States. However, it is not clear in the policies of the UN or the NGOs to what extent NGOs wish to cooperate with UN troops  and national tribal forces  of Juba regime (MSF report 2017).

___________

3. Mathiang Anyor

4. Recommendations: The Role Regional Forces can Play to Protect IDPs in United Nations Protection of Civilians (UNPOC) Sites in South Sudan as well as Refugee Camps in the neighboring countries.

4.1 Lessons from Darfur, west Sudan

 

IDP camps abound in Darfur for more than 13 years. The common denominator between the IDPs of Abu-Shuko, Zam Zam, and Tuwela in the Darfur region of Sudan and the IDPs in the UNPOC sites in South Sudan is gender violence- gang rape crimes, lack of protection, and ineffective and inefficient food aid distributions (Consult  Laku’s article gang rape in Darfur published in Embassy Newspaper May 2005). The causes of gang rape between the two camps are lack of firewood or sufficient firewood substitutes or solar ovens for cooking, insufficient food aid, milk for infants and lack of water. The only difference between these two types of camps is that the IDPs camps in Darfur are not accommodated within the peace keeping compounds in Sudan. UNAMID troops have not been overrun by IDPs.

The camps are run by United Nations Higher Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and International Organization for Migration (IOM), while in South Sudan IDPs camps are within UN premises. Gender violence and gang rape crimes are committed by both the SPLA soldiers, illegitimate ethnic dinka paramilitary of Mathiang Anyor, and SPLA in Opposition (SPLA-IO) rebels; while in Darfur mainly by Janjaweed4 illegitimate militias of National Islamic Front, that have conducted the ethnic genocidal cleansing in Darfur, concentrating its indigenous population into camps where they are more easily controlled, gang raped, exploited and liquidated. The UNAMID has also the mandate to protect such communities but has been ineffective and failed (UN reports).

The mandate of the UNAMID has been extended for one year more to provide protection to IDPs camps in Darfur, SGBV cases continue to increase, and Darfur IDPs are now forgotten and living at the mercies of genocidaires criminals of Khartoum government.  Many of the protection measures again SGBV have been left to other agencies, e.g. World Food Program (WFP) in its food camps. It introduced SAFE measure to protect against rape of women gathering firewood for cooking or water. Solar ovens were also introduced. Manufacturing of fire material other than firewood within the camp by the IDPs themselves was also introduced and special carriers for water that reduce the time women need to fetch the water and get back to the camp in time (See WFP SAFE Materials).

In the agricultural seasons many IDPs left the camps to return to their fields for two reasons mainly – to preserve their rights over the land and to plant their own food to supplement the food aid. Without UNAMID protection, they were victims of government militia and rebel assaults.

Having worked in both Sudans for many years, and an eye witness of gang rape crimes in the Darfur region of Sudan and read the recent Amnesty International report- “Do Not Remain Silent” Survivors of Sexual Violence in South Sudan Call for Justice and Reparations on the gang rape crimes against women, girls, boys and men in Juba,Yei, Malakal, Bor and Wau, the only conclusion the readers can reach to is that, the R2P mandates of UNAMID and UNMISS of civilians protection have failed as result of insecurity, South Sudanese IDPs are fleeing their villages and cities daily at high rate of 3500 person per day (UNHCR, 2017), and large number of Darfur IDPs settled in Northern Bahar Al-Ghazal in South Sudan and were forced to take refuge either in Chad or Central Africa Republic (double migration), and the UN officials on the ground and the NY headquarter have failed to learn from measures taken earlier in Darfur and to assess why they did not result in full protection (Amnesty Report 2017).

In the Amnesty International report 2017, the victims of gender violence and gang rapes living under the ‘protection’ of the UNPOC sites described in detail their suffering in forays outside of the UNPOC sites for lack of food, water, cooking supplies, provided the reasons of venturing out of UNPOCs and how they are subjected to gang rapes.

All the victims said that food distributed in the UNPOC sites is insufficient and they had to search for additional food and milk supplies for children and infants, lack of water and most importantly there was no firewood or charcoal to cook solid food aid such as brown and white beans, rice, red and brown split lentils, no solar ovens. As they ventured out in search for food, encountered either SPLA or rebels in bush and soldiers so brutally gang raped, and as result some became unconscious, fainted and find themselves into POC sites. The lucky ones received medical treatment and others didn’t; however, some women were raped and died or were killed by perpetrators (Ibid: p.25, 28, 29, 31 & 33).

The current food aid distribution defeats the overall purpose of DAC “do no harm” and new efforts are required to ensure that more realistic approaches and workable solutions are in place in order to prevent (SGBV) crimes around UNPoCs in Sudan and South Sudan. The donors’ efforts to help IDPs in the UNPOCs are commendable do save some lives; however, aid distributions require changes in new ways of thinking, new assessments that will provide positive experience rather than negative and should not cause directly and indirectly intended or unintended consequences on recipients.

4.2 Suggested Improvements

4.2.1 Increase amounts of food aid, water, cooking instruments

 

The overall analysis of the Amnesty report 2017 substantiated that most (SGBV) crimes against women, underage girls, boys and men around UNPOCs in South Sudan are committed by South Sudanese men in the tribal military uniforms and in rebels-controlled areas. The reasons given by most women were that humanitarian food aid provided by International non-governmental Organizations (INGOs) was insufficient and require firewood or alternatives which are not provided as part of the aid package.

The best approach to resolve firewood problems is for the INGOs to purchase durable easy-to-use solar cookers that can be delivered to the UNPOCs sites for under $20, complete with 4.25- liter cooking pot and glass lid. This type of solar cooker is almost indestructible and will make perfect ugali in an hour or two with no stirring until right at the end, and it will never burn out, but most importantly it will save women, younger girls and men live as well as prevent them venturing out of UNPOCs.

The UNMISS can discuss with the IDPs the possibility of sending out patrols to protect those who return to their fields to plant so that they have more food.

Moreover, in an event of lack of UNMISS funds to purchase solar cookers, part of 16000 UN protection forces in South Sudan should organize convoys to escort women to market either on foot or by vehicles to buy firewood as well as other daily or weekly necessities. Another workable solution is for the UN and INGOs should delivery firewood, charcoal, propane gas and water to IDPs in POCs sites. The market convoy can be twice or three times a week based on consultation with women IDPs.

The UN and INGOs should revise the current humanitarian aid distributions system and need assessment to include increasing daily and weekly food ration, provide charcoal, firewood, propane gas, solar cookers, hygienic articles for women and girls, water, and infant milk and arrange escorts convey to drive women to market (see Enough 2015, and Amnesty International). These measures will definitely reduce and put an end to (SGBV) crimes against women as well as save lives in war zones areas and refugees camps, but overall strategy is to fulfill UNMISS mandate.

 

4.2.2 Night patrols

 

The current practice of UNMISS in South Sudan is to undertake daily patrols during the daytime inside Juba. This is not the best patrol practice to deter organized criminals, and this should be modified to night joint UNMISS and SPLA forces. The paper condemns any unauthorized SPLA forces from movement within Juba between 2100-0600 hours, in major cities where the IDPs are concentrated and UNMISS mandate should be extended to include areas around refugee camps where killings happen daily.

The reasoning behind night patrols is to prevent criminals within tribal SPLA forces who are committing rape, killings and looting in major cities in the country and rebels from looting humanitarian aid from refugees at gun points and the sale of food aid in neighboring countries market. The protection should include South Sudanese women engaging in cross border trade and smuggling. Also, most gang rape crimes occurred at evening and night times according to the witnesses in the Amnesty Report (Amnesty 2017), so it makes perfect sense for the UN protection forces to patrol the major cities and POCs at night to deter SPLA soldiers. It ought to expand night patrols to all major cities such as Juba, Wau, and Malakal which are experiencing high rate of killing, rapes, and robbers.

While the UNMISS has not yet implemented night patrols of the peace keeping troops, there are SPLA force night patrols. The current composition of tribal SPLA force night patrols consists of soldiers mainly from one tribal group either Dinka and Nuer, communicate in one tribal language and this kind of composition facilitates looting, raping stealing, targeted killings and crimes cover up in Juba city much easier.

As mentioned, the UN has reported that it is aiming to increase the number of patrols at night on the basis of a report (Al-Jazeera 2016/11) this year that daytime patrols are insufficient. Why the UN did not have night patrols from the start is unknown. Perhaps this deficiency reflects the knowledge gaps that arise from poor reporting. For it is common knowledge that gang rapes take place in Juba every night. No doubt in other cities as well. The UN ought to explain publicly this gap in knowledge and if known why night patrols did not take place.

As mentioned above, in addition to night patrols there can be patrols accompanying those who return to plant their fields to supplement their food rations.

4.2.3 Reporting Human Rights or Human Wrong Violations  

 

The UN should accelerate funding for the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan and its logistics as outlined in the ARCSS of 2015 as well as to establish an independent mechanism (e.g. An Independent Commission for justice and accountability) to assist in investigating violations in the country, preserve evidences, conduct extensive video /audio interviews with survivors and witnesses to collect SGBV cases. This is the only way victims will have hope in international legal system as well as will deter government soldiers and rebel criminals. The UUMISS should establish a system to protect and provide safety for witnesses. Currently, the discussion is centered on the establishing hybrid court and human rights investigative body to investigate crimes against humanity and persecute war criminals within South Sudanese forces as well as rebels’ groups; but, in practice there is lengthy delay in the implementations and funding.

On the other hand, ARCSS should be replacing with new agreement that has larger framework to include current opposition groups as well as new IGAD consultations initiatives.

4.2.4 More authority to UNMISS troops

 

Juba is not South Sudan, and South Sudan is bigger than Juba city. The overall UNMISS strategy should not focus only on better planning, preparation and establishment of a weapons-free-zones around the POC sites in Juba, but new strategy should empower peacekeeping forces with power to arrest, detain, fight back and enter into combat against law breakers; but most importantly strategy is should focus on put an end to political crisis in the country and search new strategy to achieve peace as well as establish technocrat transitional government to prepare the country for fair, free and transparence general elections in 2020.

4.2.5 Medical support

 

The UNMISS should establish well equipped medical centres in the UNPOCs across the country equipped with psychiatrists, psycho-social therapists and trauma counselors   to treat gender violence cases as well as to help survivors of sexual violence to restore their physical and psychological well-being.

The UNMISS should strengthen its existing partnership linkages with MSF which has expertise in medical field. They ought to coordinate operations and logistics together and benefit each other from experiences. But if INGOS have policies against cooperation with military, then the UNMISS ought to rely on its own resources to fund the medical help needed physically for assaulted civilian victims of any gender and personnel for mental illnesses and support for victims who lose limbs in attacks on civilians.

 

4.2.6 Expand number of POC sites and better equip

 

The UNMISS should establish new POC sites to accommodate newcomers and to avoid repeated evictions of a grandma in Bentiu POC camp (MSF, Grandma’).

To improve POC sites, the UNMISS should supply each IDP’s household in the POC sites with (10’x30’) Tent that has 6 removable side walls. Tents can protect IDPs from sickness that have resulted directly in the overcrowded and deplorable conditions as well as provide IDPs with tempera shelters.  Tents and access to adequate water, and sanitation can improve the basic conditions and positive environment in the POC sites.

4.2.7 In-Sites Conflicts

 

The UNMISS should support the work of traditional authorities (Chiefs) in some POCs sites with operation and logistics, but should not rely on them 100% as some cases might require police investigation (LSE). Where police investigation is needed IDPs ought to be consulted on how much they trust the tribal South Sudan police and require strict observation of police interactions with IDPS by the UN Police Observers, who are often excluded from national police interrogations.

4.2.8 Livelihoods training

 

In the Darfur IDP camps, the specialized UN agencies and NGOs/INGOs introduced livelihoods training, e.g. food for education. Taking a lesson from this, the UNMISS mandate should establish literacy classes, small skilled trader training, and small business enterprise training in the POC sites to equip IDPs with some knowledge for future use in lieu of organizing cricket and tawkenodo sports.

4.2.9. The UNMISS should be mindful of Charcoal Trade Leading which can lead to Deforestation in South Sudan

 

CONCLUSIONS

The UNMISS DPKO needs to take a hard look at its POCs mandate in terms of its implementation. It can ask for more women peacekeepers, ask for more troops trained in humanitarian crises, turn over the management of POC to specialized agencies and concentrate on its military/policing powers, or use the help of UNHCR/IOM to transfer as many civilians as possible to proper refugee and IDP camps. Long-term POC confuses the situation by duplicating the mandates of specialized agencies. POC sites can only be temporary situation with a clear plan of transfer. The peace keeping mandate becomes otherwise too diluted and peace keeping funds are diverted.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

©Hüstin Läkü, Sr., is a native South Sudanese, and educated in South Sudan, Sudan, Egypt, Germany and Switzerland. He is a graduate of University of Fribourg in Switzerland; Caux Scholars Program in Switzerland, and University of Ottawa in Canada.

His current research topic Title: Evaluating South Sudan Governance: From Perspective of Federated Forms and/or Devolution; Politics of Foreign Aid in Africa-The Myth of Foreign Aid in Africa: Case Sudan and South Sudan and the Role of Agricultural in South Sudan’s Economic Development.

Läkü Sr, helped create Sudan Health Care and Education Project (SHCEP) to improve public health care and Education in South Sudan through knowledge transfer, professional development and capacity building. Through SHCEP, Hüstin working with university-based Canadian physicians and 190 medical professionals in the County of Cornell in the U.S.A., he brought about the donation of ten railroad carloads of medical training equipment, wheelchairs, medical textbooks, nursing and health sciences, physic, Chemistry, Biology and English textbooks worth about one million dollars and equipped 13 medical clinics around Central Equatoria State.

Currently, he is working on new projects, building partnerships between Carleton and Ottawa universities, and Juba University; building a school for girls in Eastern Equatorial State; and Seed for Democracy for South Sudan (SfDSS).

The mission of SfDSS is to prepare South Sudan, to understand and adopt the democratic processes and practices that would help it ensure future peaceful transference of power from successive governments.

Hüstin Läkü, Sr., is a recipient of Dr. Martin Luther, Jr, Dream Keepers Award, and Queen Elizabeth II model for Humanitarianism.


 

Endnotes:

1.    The Human Rights Commission was established under the auspices of the United Nations with mandate to monitor, investigate, verify and report on abuses, violations of human rights, violations of International humanitarian law and the most serious crimes in South Sudan since December 2013 by inter alia collecting and preserving evidences of human rights violations and abuses and violation of international Humanitarian Law and by supporting criminal proceedings before the hybrid court and national, regional and international tribunals with jurisdiction over such crimes (OHCHR 2017).

2.    Japanese Engineers Members of UNMISS Support First National Karate Competition in South Sudan.

3.    Mathiang Anyor are is located at the Luri training centre west of Juba city. Luri is a Bari community land grabbed by Kiir in order to establish his cattle ranch. These illegitimate para military groups were funded by the national budget. The recruitment and composition of tribal groups are mainly from Awiel and Warrap States PM and Kiir’s home states. They operate independent of SPLA with strict tribal mandate to shot and kill rape, loot and grabbed non dinka lands and properties. The groups lack military training as well as rules and regulations and it replaces the existence security sectors.

4.    Janjaweed are paramilitary trained, armed and paid by Khartoum regime and responsible for killing, raping, torturing, insecurity, human rights violations, crimes against humanity and Darfur genocide.

 

REFERENCES

Amnesty International, “DO NOT REMAIN SILENT” SURVIVORS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN SOUTH SUDAN CALL FOR JUSTICE AND REPARATIONS, last read July 30, 2017

Enough, Food Culture and Conflict in South Sudan, last read September 1st, 2017

Embassy [Canada] Newspaper. Retrieved on September 1st, 2017, from: Last read on September 1st, 2017

LSE, Traditional authorities work in POCs sites in South Sudan. Retrieved from: blogs.lse.ac.uk/jsrp/2016/09/29/chiefs-courts-protecting-civilians-in-south-sudan/September, Last read on September 13th, 2017

Medicins sans Frontieres (MSF), Providing medical treatment to IDPs and Refugees. Retrieved from: last read September 13th, 20173

MSF, Grandma evicted from POC in Bentiu, last read September 13th, 20177

South Sudan agrees to deploy regional protection force. Retrieved on December 2017, From: The Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan through  of 23 March 2016. Retrieved on September 2017, from: The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness., last read on September 1st, 2017

UNMISS, JAPANESE ENGINEERS SUPPORT FIRST NATIONAL KARATE COMPETITION IN


SOUTH SUDAN. , last Read september 1st, 2017 UNMISS Mandate. Retrieved on September 1st, 2017, from

Weiss, T. (2004), Military-Civilian Interactions: Humanitarian Crisis and the

Responsibility to Protect. Oxford: Roman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Japanese Engineers Members of UNMISS

Support First National Karate Competition in South Sudan.

Thursday, December 21, 2017

Administrative Corruption, Nepotism, Injustice and Discrimination in South Sudan


ABSTRACT:

This paper discusses military, police, prison, customs, wildlife, foreign services officers and public servants promotions, assignments and deployments system in South Sudan. The paper argues that since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA 2005-2011) and Post-Referendum eras, promotions, assignments, deployments, recruitments, hiring and rehiring of organized force personnel, foreign services officers and public servants lack fairness, transparency and equity and this is one of the many reasons that led the country  into this current political and humanitarian crisis as well as culture of killings, rape of young girls, boys, women, and aid workers, land grabbing, looting of civilians’ properties with impunity, because Kiir, Gen. Malong, Gen. Achuil Tito and Jieng council of elders assigned and promoted illiterate, unqualified, incompetent, untrained, and inexperienced close relatives, son-in-laws, daughter-in-laws, and tribesmen/women in important and sensitive government institutions to run these government offices as Animal Farms.

The culture of discriminations, injustice, unpunished crimes committed by SPLA soldiers, killing, rape and land grabbing of non-Dinka in their areas, dated back to the liberation time and it is not something that started under Kiir, but during the liberation era. It is said that, the SPLM commanders and leaders brainwashed many young persons whom they recruited to ignore the ethnics of their culture all in the name of freedom from Khartoum. An independent eye witness recall one of the commanders in the Rumbek area who started attacking unarmed civilians even though he new it ran against the ethnics of the Dinka law never to slay an unarmed person and similar events of Rumbek are been repeated in the independent South Sudan. Kiir has just perpetuated it and developed it to high level with the support of Mathiang Aynor, Gelweng and Dothubany.

Further, it argues that the current dysfunctional state of affairs in South Sudan is a clear evidence of a mess created by Kiir, Jieng council of elders (JCE), Mathiang Aynor, Gelweng and Dothubany. Finally, it sheds light on study carried out from June to December 2017. As this is work in progress, the study faced some limitations in accessing complete data on some individual officers and foreign services officers.

The study shows that, there are injustices, discriminations, and lack of fairness and equity in recruitments, hiring, rehiring, promotions, assignments, and deployments of non-Dinka in government institutions. The paper offers concrete way forward and it commences with promotions, recruitments, hiring and rehiring policy in the Post-CPA and Referendum periods.

Only a year or two after the CPA came into effect, Gurtong online newspaper has published an article on the unfair distribution of positions in the Ministry of Justice under Michael Makuei. Gurtong made it very clear that, there was a dominance of Dinka in all Southern Sudan government institutions as well as organized forces. Therefore, knowledge of this has been going on for a long time, but nothing was done or taken seriously by the international donors, African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The fear of dominance by the Dinka in the liberation movement was clear in the proposals of federalism coming from 64 ethnic intellectuals.

In the Post-CPA period, the promotions, recruitments, hiring, rehiring policy was designed to favor SPLA/M carders of two ethnicities of Dinka and Nuer. Within SPLA/M non-Dinka carders were deliberately deprived of promotions, deployments and assignments and most were placed on non-active lists, while their Dinka cohorts were promoted to high ranks and assigned to lead important and sensitive organized forces departments in non-Dinka states. Dinka government in Juba is using similar tactic of former Sudan-suppresses opponents specially Equatorians the fathers of federalism and Kokora-It is payback time.

Below are some examples to illustrate administrative corruption, nepotism, discriminations and injustice against non-Dinka in organized forces, foreign services and public services. This same discriminatory policy under the Khartoum era that is, promoting northerners in higher military and public services positions over competent southerners is what led in part to the mutinies and liberation wars of 1956 and 1983. Hence no surprise what occurred in the South. Same discriminatory patterns prevailed. The 2016 South Sudan Police Service promotions process was planned, and doctored at Gen. Achuil Tito, Chief of South Sudan Police residence in Juba.

Maj. Gen. Salah Samsona was born in Juba, and citizen of Central Equatoria State (CES). Gen. Samsona is a graduate of a Conflict Resolution program and School of Management, school of law, Omduraman Al-Ahlia Universities (OAU) and Sudanese Police Academy. Gen. Samsona was forced into early retirement and placed on non-active list, while illiterate Majak Akec Malok without formal education and police training was promoted three times in a short period of time from Colonel to Brigadier, Major General, finally to Lt. General and assigned as Director of Nationality, Passports, and Immigration. On the other hand, highly qualified, experienced, competent, well trained and skillful non-Dinka officers who held similar positions in the former Sudan’s Directorate of Nationality, Passports and Immigration were either demoted, depraved promotions, assignments and deployments or placed on non-active list.

Moreover, Gen. Salah Samsona is same cohort 47as Lt. Gen. Syed Chawul Lom. Both officers worked in Khartoum for many years where Gen. Chawul was dismissed three times for breached of police work ethics and conflict of interest. During the CPA period, both Generals were reinstated into South Sudan police services, and Gen. Chawul was promoted to rank of Chief of police while Gen. Samsona with strong academic background in policing, law, conflict resolutions, and management and experience was place on non-active list (see the 2005-2016 South Sudan Police Service Promotion Lists).   

Atem Moral is citizen of Jonglei State, SPLA soldier with no knowledge and experience and skills in policing. As a result of administrative corruption and nepotism Gen. Achuil promoted Moral to Major General and assigned him as Dean of South Sudan Police College in Rajaf, to replace Major General Martin Wani. Gen. Wani is well qualified, experience, professional Sudan Police Academy with many graduate and post graduate degrees in policing, security and legal studies. These practices of Kiir’s government explain why South Sudan Police system is not efficient, and corrupt and the police are using color of their authorities to kill, terrorize, rap, and arrest non-Dinka and detained them at South Sudan National Security (SSNS). The current detainees at the SSNS are all non-Dinka mostly from Equatoria States and the there is no one detainee from Kiir’s home State of Warrap and JCE States (See detainees list of period of 2015-2017). 

Maj.Gen. Rhabi E. Mujung was born in Juba, and citizen of (CES). Gen. Mujung is a graduate of School of Sciences Management with emphasis in Business, University of Juba, South Sudan; Sudanese Military Academy; the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) in London, U.K. Gen. Mujung was a classmate and roommate of King Abdullah II of Jordan. He holds Certificates and Diplomas in Standard Military Course (SMC), and Regular Career Course (RCC) and Certificate in senior military Command and Leadership from the US-African Strategic Research Centre. Gen. Mujung is well-respected senior military officer who commanded several fronts during the war liberation and by far is the most qualified, experienced and skillful SPLA officer, but as a non Dinka he was deprived of promotions and benefits such as vehicle and others for over 10 years, even though he is an SPLA officer fought in Southern and Eastern Sudan bushes, while illiterate Paul Malong without formal education and military training was promoted to Lt. General and Chief of Staff of SPLA to preside over qualified, competent, experienced, skillful and senior non Dinka Officers (The 2005-2017 SPLA Promotions List).

Brigadier Joseph Kornelio is a citizen of Western Bahr Al-Ghazal and member of Fertit ethnic group. Brig. Kornelio is a graduate of Sudanese Military Academy 1978, cohort 27. Brigadier Kornelio is very senior and highly qualified having the rank of Brigadier, this is an example of a non-Dinka highly qualified, but reinstated at lower rank despite his extensive and outstanding military career experience.

Similarly Col. Juwang Taktak, is a member of Murle ethnic group. Col. Taktak is a graduate of Sudanese Military Academy in Khartoum in 1988/cohort 38. Col. Taktak
was reinstated at the rank of Colonel, this is another example of discrimination.
Brigadier. Oben George, is a citizen of Upper Nile State and member of Shilluk ethnic group. Brig. George is a graduate of Sudanese Military Academy in Khartoum in 1981/cohort 30.

Brigadier. Obour Chol, is a citizen of Upper Nile State and member of Shilluk ethnic group. Brig. Chol is a graduate of Sudanese Military Academy in 1981/cohort 30.Both Brigadiers George and Chol are very seniors, highly qualified officers than Paul Malong and James Ajongo, the current Chief of Staff. Both Malong and Ajongo experiences and academic backgrounds cannot match Brigadiers’ experiences and skills and will never come close to these non-Dinka senior officers.

But the worst case of all is William Philip Subek. Officer Subek is a citizen of CES.  Equatoria State. Officer Subek is a graduate of Sudanese Military Academy, reinstated in the organized forces in South Sudan, then demoted to rank of Sergeant, while his Dinka cohorts and illiterate Paul Malong and others such as Gordon Buay were promoted to full Generals, assigned and posted to D.C., as Deputy Head of Mission. Buay holds B.A., in legal studies from Carleton University in Canada, and never had any professional job in Canada as well as one day military training.

Both Dr. James Alphonse and Dr. Lado Luate are citizens of CES, and graduates of School of medicine and Sudanese Military Academy. Both Doctors were placed on the non-active list without assignments in time country though there is a need of well qualified and experienced medical doctors. Dr. Alphonse and Dr. Luate’s junior Dinka officers were assigned to take charge and be responsible in the military hospital in Juba.  For further details about discrimination and injustice within the organized forces, please, consult the attached promotion lists.

Similarly, most of public service senior positions are filled in by unqualified Dinka and well-trained and competent non-Dinka lawyers and judges are either fired for no legal reasons, deprive promotions and assignments.

Dr. Sam Taban, citizen of (CES). He holds Ph.D., in International Law (I/L) from Poland and worked abroad for many years  and returned to help rebuilding broken legal system in South Sudan. Dr. Taban returned to South Sudan and joined Ministry of legal Affairs in 2011 and dismissed early this year 2017.

Justice, Jeremiah Swaka, is a citizen of CES. Justice Swaka holds LLM, and law Degrees from University of Khartoum, and M.A., in Conflict Resolutions from University of Juba. Justice Swaka was a senior judge in Southern Sudan in 1980s and Khartoum in 1990s as well as legal Advisor to Sudan Council of Churches in Khartoum in 2000s. Like Dr. Taban and Dr. Gerey Raimondo, Justice Swaka was dismissed early this year for no reason. Unfortunately, their dismissal occurred in a time where broken legal system in the country requires their expertise.

Ambassador Francis F. Nazario is a citizen of Easter Equatoria State (EES), and a member of Acholi ethnic group. Amb. Nazario holds Ph.D., and M.A., in Political Sciences from France and B.A., from Khartoum University. Amb. Nazario was South Sudanese Deputy Head of Mission in New York, was fired and replaced by cook helper related to Kirr.   

To be fair, and to its credit, Juba regime in fact did promote some non-Dinka loyalists, political disciples of JCE, and other Judases of injustice to high ranks and senior political positions. The overall tactics and strategy of loyalists’ promotion is to suppress their intuitions, silence and buy their hearts through appointments to conceal the regime’s rape of foreign aid workers, land grabbing crimes, killing campaign against farming communities in Equatoria states and other parts of the country.  The promotions and appointments of non-Dinka loyalists and political disciples of JCE are meaningless if injustice, discrimination, and administrative corruption, domestic terror campaigns and land grabbing still continue.

The regime placed political disciples of JCE in key positions in order to protect the regime’s national and international images, as well as to protect JCE interests in the non-Dinka States. As John Isbister, the Canadian economist, argues in his book”Promises Not Kept, Poverty and the Betrayal in 3rd World Development” the former colonial systems sent sons of African middle classes to study in the U.K., France, Belgium and Portugal and the purpose was to condition them and later send back to Africa in the Post-Independence era to replace colonial masters/mistresses and to protect the latter’s interests in Africa (Isbister, 2006).

However, the good news according to the African liberation bible is that, some loyalists have realized that the era of self-interests and personal gains are coming to an end and change of hearts is a must, and as a result they formed military resistance and political opposition groups to effect change in the country. On another hand, some loyalists and political disciples of JCE still maintain their positions within the corrupt system as well as turned blind eyes to injustice, discrimination, administrative corruption, inequality and the policy of Dinka tribal dominance Kiir’s regime in South Sudan.

Here is a list of some promoted loyalists in the CPA and Post-Referendum eras, both non-Dinka and Dinka and JCE political disciples who saw the point of Isbister’s arguments and realized they were being used to further the colonialists’ agenda and decided to form opposition against Juba regime: Dr. Riek Machar, Angelina Teny, Gen. Thomas Cyrilio, Gov. Joseph Bakasoro, Dr. Lam Akol, Paul Malong and Suzanne Jambo, former SPLM National Secretary for External Relations. In e-mails exchange with diaspora members, Ms. Jambo had this to say: 
Landi and the good reverend Andrew Henry, Nyatom et el,
You guys are so tired of washing dishes and doing dirty manual work in Europe & USA etc you think your best bet is an 11th hour wake up call to 'keyboard unguided missiles throwing serve' your nation after 15th Dec 2013. 

If you google some of us, you will see our remarkable career history - some of us are here purely to serve our Nation. So please don't slither and salivate over nothing. More is yet to come brethren! 

Now the former loyalists are fighting the injustice, discrimination, promotion, assignment, and deployment deprivations policy of Juba regime.

The injustice, discrimination, promotion, assignment, and deployment deprivations also include non-Dinka officer graduates of Sudanese military, police, prison, customs and wildlife academies and universities who have served under the national government of former Sudan with competency, efficiency and effectiveness have been reinstated and integrated into South Sudan organized forces at lower ranks, while their peers of the same class were promoted to ranks as high as Major General, Lt. General, Director and Director General.  The integrity of these services and the morale of the officers are threatened by a situation where officers who have been active in duty have been left behind, whilst those who have been out of service for many years or even abroad are reinstated and promoted to high ranks and assigned in high positions.

The issues of promotion, assignment, deployment deprivations were addressed to President and the First South Sudanese Minister of Interior, late Alison Magaya many times, but all efforts yield no positive results. Additionally, there are no mechanisms for countering such injustices and any move to resolve it is blocked by Dinka Chief of Police and the Minister as well as all complains landed in the hands of Dinka.

Most of Dinka officers who were members of organized forces in the former Sudan and some have lived in the Western countries for many years with their knowledge of the organized forces system forgotten and out of date were reinstated, promoted, assigned high positions and deployed in important and sensitive organized forces Directorates; meanwhile, outstanding non-Dinka officers with excellent performance records, excellent academic credentials and strong experience are overlooked in promotions and deprived from constitutional rights as well as assignments and deployments.

Unfairness in the reinstatement and promotion process for the South Sudanese officers has demoralized the effectiveness of organized forces.  An inequitable environment for job security and advancement in the service results in organized forces incompetence, inaction and corruption, rather than motivating officers to work hard to deter and prevent crime, such as the high rate of killings in Juba and other parts of South Sudan.  Officers have a right to ask why priority for reinstatement and promotion is being given to officers who spent many years abroad and promotions of one ethnicity of Dinka only.

Promotions, assignments, deployments, and postings are designed to serve interests and benefit of JCE members, while demotions and non-active list for non-Dinka especially, the Equatorians, Fertit groups and Nuer. Demotion, deprivation of promotions, assignments, deployments and disarming non-Dinka during Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards program (IDDRS) was a sign of one ethnicity hegemony and domination (See 2010-2011 Report of Lakes State Investigation Commission).

The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards program (IDDRS) failed, because the Southern Sudan government plan under Kiir and JCE leadership was to disarmed non-Dinka only, armed Dinka and permit their cattle under security protections to graze in the land of farming communities in Equatoria State resulted in inter-communal conflicts. The policy of arming one ethnicity is the source of current violence, fighting and killings in Lakes region which left at least 170 dead. This is evidence of arming one ethnic group in Lakes, Warrap Northern Bhar Al-Ghazal and Jonglei against the others (Reuters News: December 12th, 2017).  

For instance, below are some reasons why DDR failed in Southern Sudan.
Yet the participants from Wau and Aweil, who began the process [DDR] as late as mid-2010, appear equally ineligible. Instead, the verification process is flawed at multiple levels.
The verification problem persists today. Despite calls from the international community for better accountability, and with the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (SSDDRC) apparently unwilling to challenge the SPLA on candidate selection, there remains no external, independent verification process. As a result, there are few disincentives for SPLA state commanders to falsify information or use the DDR programme as a kind of social service to assist selected individuals who have already returned to civilian life (Small Arm Survey, p.7&8, Number 17, May 2017).

The deprivation of promotion, assignment, and deployment study shows that, JCE nepotism, administration corruption, discrimination and inequality is targeting well qualified and trained, experienced, skillful and competent non-Dinks officers in all organized forces as well as across government institutions. For instance; the recent unfair dismissal of Mr. Avelino Andruga, Head Teacher of Rumbek National Secondary School is another targeted non-Dinka qualified public servant (Ministerial Order Number 32/2017, November 30th, 2017).

The purpose of this study is to help the international community, Troika, IGAD, AU and Members of Opposition negotiation teams with valuable and substantive evidence of discrimination, administrative corruption and injustice in the current security sectors, organized forces and public services in South Sudan. It is also clear that, the country was built on the dominance of one ethnic group-the Dinka to control administrative, economic, military and political powers. Furthermore, this may explain why Nuer were targeted in the senseless December 2013 senseless civil war, because Nuer is perceived as a threat to Dinka hegemony, defeats JCE Master Plan and now the system turns against federalist supporters-the Equatorians.

This current injustice and discrimination in South Sudanese organized forces and public service serve as catalyst for future instability and spoiler for peace agreement implementation, nation and state building, peace building, power sharing and power division unless injustice, discrimination and deliberate demotions of non-Dinka issue should be address and give full attention in the current peace revitalization talks in Addis.

The paper argues that, the current peace revitalization in progress is litmus test for the stakeholders to consider the following issues: SPLA and all organized forces should be dismantle and new ones should be establish and rebuild from bottom up, new system of recruitment should be establish and must be based on entrance exams and merits to avoid future political crisis as well as administrative corruption, nepotism, injustice and discrimination in public services and organized forcesAs some in the international community such as Hilde Johnson believes firmly that, the current war grew out of apolitical crisis and turned ethnic (Johnson, 2016). My paper shows that is only part of the story. It also grows out of an ethnic crisis in which one group wishes to dominate all the 60 ethnic groups.

The way forward

The administrative corruption, injustice, demotion and deprivation of promotions, assignments, and deployments are deliberately planned under the JCE Master Plan (See The 2015 Dinka Development Plan (DDP)), and for South Sudan to move forward, the peace revitalization process must factor into future Peace talks and agreements the following:

Political system: urgency to draft New Federal Constitutions, and dissolve current parliament.
Requirement to be an M.P.: Minimum: High School Certificate.

Electoral Constituencies: Redrawing Electoral constituencies map base on population’s size.

Council of States (120 Members): Its Members should be elected and in an event of appointment by President, it’s members should be representatives of 66 ethnic group. For instance, each ethnic group should have 2 members in the Council of States
Requirement: Minimum: High School Certificate.

Security Sector: dismantle current SPLA, security organs and organized forces and rebuild and develop national South Sudanese Army Forces (SSAF), police, prison, customs, wildlife, and other security organs that reflect national character. Recruitment should be based on quotas system, entrance exams, medical fitness, background checks as well as merit. The mandate of SSAF is to defend the country and it’s Constitution. Police and other sectors are for internal security only.
Requirement: Minimum: High School Certificate.
Promotions: Should based on performances, medical fitness, practical and written exams.  
Public Services Recruitment: should be based quotas system on the three regions.
Requirement: Minimum: High School Certificate

Foreign Services Recruitment: should be based on quotas system of the three regions.
Requirement: Minimum: University Degree, and M.A., and foreign languages is an assessed

Governance system: Should be based on Confederation of the three regions of Equatoria, Bahr Al-Ghazal and Upper Nile. The Confederation system should be based on a consultative constitutional forums to decide Confederation, but Swiss model of Confederation is the most suitable for South Sudan. The Constitution Review should be based on the South African process that lasted over 2 years.

Negotiators should make sure that element of revitalization of peace agreement must include SPLA and other security sectors restructuring and complete rebuilding new national organized forces, otherwise South Sudan will revisit ordeal of July 2016.

Stability of the country and peace agreement implementation will only hold when newly trained, qualified, experienced and competent personnel are recruited and composition of new South Sudan defense forces reflects representatives of 60 ethnicity.

South Sudan has 60 ethnic groups (The House of Nationalities,2002, p.19,&53) and it is not fair for groups such as Swiss peace, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Chatham House UK based Think Tank and other INGOs that keep promoting one sided ethnic view on the current political crisis in South Sudan rather than promoting inclusiveness. Through their consultative meetings, conferences and interns programs. The current behavior and practices of these groups are helping Dinka hegemony and domination in the country.

This past summer of 2017, Swiss peace organization hosted conference on South Sudan and invited only members of one ethnic group to participated in the conference in Switzerland, similarly, USIP hosted two interns one is Dinka and Nuer for couple months in the U.S., and Chatham House hosted several consultative meetings on the current political situations, but only extended invitation to members of one ethnic group to represent the country. I do hope Swiss peace; USIP, Chatham and other groups will not transfer Juba regime’s unfairness policy to international space as well as refrain from promoting one ethnic group through their intern programs, conference, and consultative meetings and be on the right side of history.

What Should Transitional Government Do?

A Transitional government should reflect national characters of the House of Nationalities and should be led by the small ethnic groups. The small ethnic group should choose suitable servant leader for leadership to govern the country.

Old Guards

Kiir, Riek, Igga, Gai and anyone who was part (served in any capacities) of post CPA and Post referendum (2005-2018) must not be part of transitional government, because they the very ones who created the mess South Sudan is in today and current political and humanitarian crisis. They cannot offer anything new to move the country forward. 

Opposition Groups
Old opposition groups must be excluded from a transitional government; however, oppositions may negotiate for future balance government under the leadership of small ethnic groups.
Opposition groups should build political parties, civic education and prepare the country for future General Elections.
How to defeat government
For the opposition to be effect and effect change in the country, they should coordinate their attacks simultaneously. For instance, Lam and Johnson can operate from north east, IO and Abdul bagi from north west, and TC and IO in Great Equatoria. The coordinated and simultaneously attacks will put government under sieges and will provide oppositions with upper hands in the negotiation. 
Education
A transitional government should reform education system and adhered to one curriculum. Transitional government should increase education and health budget from 7% t0 35%.
Public and Foreign Services
Public and foreign services of transitional under the leadership of small ethnic group should be balance and should reflect national characters of the House Nationalities.
Ambassadors and foreign Services Officers
Transitional government should reduce diplomatic missions to 25 embassies and reduce ambassadors 125 to 50 ambassadors. Ambassador’s appointment must be subject to new parliament confirmation. 
Ambassadors and Foreign Services Officers must be college and university graduates and must meet job merits.
Tax System
Tax collections should under state authorities and State shall only remits federal government percentage. Higher percentage should be allotted to state government for services.  
Security
Security, police, prison, wildlife, military and other organize forces recruitments must be based on experiences, merits, and strong academic background. The highly qualified officers graduates of police, prison, wildlife and military colleges and universities should be selected to form recruitment boards (boards for officers and soldiers and promotions) and to restructure and organize organizer forces according to international system in transitional period. Board should reflect national characters of the House of Nationalities
Police
Police in a transitional government period must be under state authorities- i.e. each State and County should have their own police. The recruitments must be under State authorities. The members of County and State police must be State citizens
Police, Prison, Custom, Wildlife and Military college’s Deans, Police Chief and Directors of Directorate 

Police, prison, Custom, Wildlife and Military College Deans must be organizer forces college graduate and university degree is an asset


Judiciary Reform
The current judiciary requires complete reform specially in the area of land and property law. The new reform should address the burning issues of land grabbing from their rightful owners. The leadership of transitional and future governments must enact legislation and law that will facilitate return of grabbed lands to their rightful owners. The land issue in South Sudan is a time bombs.  

Transitional government should establish Tribunal and Mobile Courts to persecute land grabbing criminals and compensate the rightful owners for their lost.    
Retirement Trust Fund: With the support of international donors, the trust fund should be established to pension off unqualified SPLA soldiers and officers in all organizers forces. The trust fund should pay for the following: health, education, monthly salary and retraining programs.  This trust fund should be managed properly to avoid recurrence of new rebellion by former unqualified SPLA soldiers and officers.
Failure of mediators to include above issues in the current peace talks and political settlements; and transitional and future governments in South Sudan to address these issues in new Constitution that is approve by the grass-root (in holistic manner- from bottom-up and top-bottom), the country may be face political unrest and recurrences of humanitarian crisis in the near future. 

In a nutshell, the mess South Sudan is in today and current political and humanitarian crisis are result of unfairness policy, the one ethnic group domination, control of administrative, economic, military and political powers, and administrative corruption, discrimination, injustice and nepotism. 

Peoples of South Sudan fought successive Khartoum's regimes, because of unfairness, injustice, inequality, favoritism, preferential treatments and discrimination in the old Sudan, and some of South Sudan military, Police, Prison, customs and wildlife officers are experiencing similar administrative corruption, injustice, inequality, nepotism, and discrimination, nepotism, favoritism and preferential treatments in the current South Sudanese system. Peace without justice and equality is not a peace, it is tribalism. 

© Hüstin Läkü,Sr

Is a native South Sudanese, and educated in South Sudan, Sudan, Egypt, Germany and Switzerland. His current research topic Title: Evaluating South Sudan Governance: From Perspective of Federated Forms and/or Devolution. Moreover, Hüstin has lectured on Sudanese issues in the United States, Canadian universities, the Canadian military academy in Kingston, Rome, Berlin, Innsbruck, Geneva, London, Slovenia and Amsterdam. Hüstin is recipient of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr life time Dream keeper Award, and Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Model for Humanitarian. He speaks Arabic, French, and Deutsch and read and write Greek and Hebrew. 

Study Results of promotions of military, police, prison, customs, wildlife and foreign services (Source: Presidential Decrees 2005-2017).



LIST OF NON ACTIVE NON DINA OFFICERS FORCED TO RETIREMENT BY JCE GOVERNMENT



NON ACTIVE LIST
Domotions are deigned to get rid of non-Dinka officers with high qualifications, experienced,skillful, competent and  strong academic backgrounds
Non Active list is designed for non-Dinka officers with high qualifications, strong academic backgrounds and competency
Non Active list is designed for non-Dinka officers who are not members of SPLA,i.e. did not fought, but served under Khartoum regime.
IRREGULARITIES AND INCONSISTENCES IN PROMOTION
Promotions are in consistence with cohort number and graduation year, E.G. senior non-Dinka officers are demoted at lower rank while SPLA Dinka members are promoted to high ranks, assigned and deployed.
Promotions are designed to benefit officers of one ethnic group and SPLA officers
LIST OF ACTIVE AND NON ACTIVE OFFICERS NON DINKA DEPRIVED OF PROMOTIONS AND FORCED TO EARLY RETIREMENT



NOTE
















A/IGP:  Assistant Inespector General for Administration of Police South Sudan Service
A/CID: Assistant Criminal Investigation Departement
DG: Director General
Non Active List
















16 out of 40 non-Dinka officers are
 citizens of CES, EES, and WES States
40%
12 out of 40 non-Dinka officers are citizens of CES
30%
3 out of 40 non-Dinka officers are citizens of WES
7.50%
1 out of 40 non-Dinka officer is citizen of EES
2.50%
1 out of 40 non-Dinka officer is female
2.50%
1 out of 40 non-Dinka officers on non active list Ph.D.,holder
2.50%
COHORT: inconsistance in promotions













Members of the same cohort 44 non-Dinka Officers are either demoted  or promoted at lower rank, while Dinka officers promoted to high ranks
Members of the same cohort 47 non-Dinka Officers are either demoted  or promoted at lower rank, while Dinka officers promoted to high ranks
PROMOTIONS
















3 out of 40 non-Dinka officers deprivate of promotions
Promotions are not consistence with cohort number and graduation year, E.G. senior non-Dinka officers are demoted at lower rank while SPLA Dinka members are promoted to high ranks, assigned and deployed.
Based on figure above, promotions are designed to eliminate non Dinka officers who are citizens of of the following States: CES, EES, WES, UNS(Shilluk, Nuer and Murle), WBG (Fertit groups), and NBG (Jurchol)
Promotions are designed to get rid of non-Dinka officers with high qualifications, experienced,skillful, competent and  strong academic backgrounds
Non Active list is designed for non-Dinka officers with high qualifications, strong academic backgrounds and competency
Non Active list is designed for non-Dinka officers who are not members of SPLA,i.e. did not fought, but served under Khartoum regime.

Lt. Colonel to Brigadier General
PROMOTIONS
%
10 out of 29 Police officers promoted are Dinka



35%





10 out of 29 Police officers promoted are University graduates



35%





8 out of 29 Police officers promoted are Police Academy graduates


28%





5 out of 29 Police officers promoted are UNS (Nuer)
17%
4 out of 29 Police officers promoted are citizens of CES
14%
3 out of 29 Police officers promoted are  citizens of Lakes
10%
3 out of 29 Police officers promoted are  citizens of Abyei
10%
3 out of 29 Police officers promoted are citizens of WES
10%
3 out of 29 Police officers promoted are Medical Doctors



10%





3 out of 29 Police officers promoted are not Police Academy graduates (SPLA)
10%
2 out of 29 Police officers promoted are citizens of WBG
7%
2 out of 29 Police officers promoted are citizens of Warrap
7%
2 out of 29 Police officers promoted are citizens of Jonglei
7%
2 out of 29 Police officers promoted ECON graduates
7%
1 out of 29 Police officer promoted is citizens of NBG
4%
1 out of 29 Police officer promoted is citizens of EES
4%
1 out of 29 Police officer promoted is Med Assistant
4%
1 out of 29 Police officers promoted one passed police academy qualifying entrance exam and graduated
4%





1 out of 29 Poice officers promoted one is Law graduate
4%
1 out of 29 Police officers promoted one is Wildlife graduate
4%
1 out of 29 Police officers promoted one is Commces graduate
4%
IRREGULARITIES AND INCONSISTENCES IN PROMOTION
Promotions process are inconsistance with cohort number and graduation year, E.G. senior non-Dinka officers are demoted at lower rank while SPLA Dinka members are promoted to high ranks, assigned and deployed.
Promotions are designed to benefit officers of one ethnic group and SPLA officers
NEPOTISM
Garang Akuel Diing Dinka officer related (Sons in law) to South Sudan Police Chief Lt. Gen Achuil Tito






©Laku's Research Centre 2017










PROMOTIONS: Colonel to Brigadier
%
40 out of 95 Police officers promoted are Dinka
42%
17 out of 95 Police officers promoted are Nuer
18%
1 out of 95  Police officer promoted is citizens of CES
1%
1 out of 95 Police officer promoted is a citizen of EES
18%
IRREGULARITIES AND INCONSISTENCES IN PROMOTION
Promotions process are inconsistance with cohort number and graduation year, E.G. senior non-Dinka officers are demoted at lower rank while SPLA Dinka members are promoted to high ranks, assigned and deployed.
Promotions are designed to benefit officers of one ethnic group and SPLA officers
NEPOTISM
GENDER
ZERO
©Laku's Research Centre 2017













Colonel to Major General


PROMOTIONS
%


20 out of 35 Police officers promoted  are Dinkas
57%

only 9 out 35 Police officers promoted are graduates of Police Academy
26%

5 out of 35 Police officers promoted  are citizens of Warrap State
14%

6 out of 35 Police officers promoted are citizens of Jonglei State (Dinka)
17%

4 out of 35 Police officers promoted  are citizens of Lakes State
12%

4 out of 35 Police officers promoted  are citizens of CES (Bari group)
12%

4 out of 35 Police officers promoted are citizens of WES State
12%

2 out of 35 Police officers promoted  are citizens of Jonglei State (Nuer)
6%

1 out of 35 Police officers promoted is citizen of Uppler Nile State (Shilluk)
3%

1 out of 35 Police officers promoted  is citizen of WBG  State (Fertit group)
3%

1 out of 35 Police officers promoted is citizen of NBG State (Jurchol)
3%

1 out of 35 Police officers promoted  has Med Degree and Police Academy graduate
3%

1 out of 35 Police officers promoted  has holds Ph.D., and Police Academy graduate
3%

1 out of 35 Police officers promoted was militia affiliate to SPLA
3%


IRREGULARITIES AND INCONSISTENCES IN PROMOTION


Promotions process are inconsistance with cohort number and graduation year, E.G. senior non-Dinka officers are demoted at lower rank while SPLA Dinka members are promoted to high ranks, assigned and deployed.

Promotions are designed to benefit officers of one ethnic group


NEPOTISM


3 Dinka Officers are related (Son in law) to South Sudan Police Chief Lt. Gen Achuil Tito









Mony Deng is brother to Lt. Gen. Peing Deng Kuol, former Police Chief and associated with Gen. Achuil Tito








Mony Deng was promoted during the time of Lt.Gen. Kuol and Gen. Tito.









Gen. Peing Kuol is half brother of Dr. Francis Deng, Member of South Sudan National Dialogue





















GENDER

ZERO


©Laku's Research Centre 2017












PROMOTIONS: Brigadier General to Major General
%
11 out of 19 Police officers promoted are Dinka
59%
12 out of 19 Police officers promoted are not Police Academy graduates (SPLA)
63%
10 out of 19 Police officers promoted  are citizens of Jonglei
53%
6 out of 19 Police officers   promoted  are Police and Prison Academy graduates
32%
2 out of 19 Police officers promoted  are citizens of Warrap
11%
2 out of 19 Police officers promoted  are citizens of CES
11%
1 out of 19 Police officers promoted is a citizen of WBG State (Fertit)
5%
1 out of 19 Police officers promoted  is a citizen of EES
5%
1 out of 19 Police officers  promoted  is a citizes of WES
5%
1 out 19 Police officer promoted  holds Law Degree and Police Academy graduate
5%
IRREGULARITIES AND INCONSISTENCES IN PROMOTION
Promotions process are inconsistance with cohort number and graduation year, E.G. senior non-Dinka officers are demoted at lower rank while SPLA Dinka members are promoted to high ranks, assigned and deployed.
Promotions are designed to benefit officers of one ethnic group and SPLA officers
NEPOTISM
Kuir Thon Arok: 
Reinstated and promoted to Major General in a short period while his non Dinka cohort were not reinstated.
Restatement policy targeted Dinka only.   
GENDER
ZERO
©Laku's Research Centre 2017















ILLEGAL PROMOTIONS FROM 2nd LIEUTENNAT TO LIEUTENNANT GENERAL




NOTE
All Officers are Dinka
100%
PROMOTIONS
5 out 5 Dinka Police officers are not Career officers
80%
5 out 5 Dinka Police officers are not graduates of Police Academy
80%
1 out of 5 Dinka Police officer promoted from Colonel to Lientennant  General
20%
2 out of 5 Dinka Police officer promoted from Lientennant Colonel to Brigadier General
40%
1 out of 5 Dinka Police officer promoted from Major to Brigadier General
20%
1 out of 5 Dinka Police office is promoted 1st Lt to Colonel
20%
Promotion is designed for Dinka officers to hold important and sensitive police departments without experience and ski
OUTCOME OF ILLEGAL PROMOTIONS:
Administrative Corruption, ineffectivness of police service
High rate of crimes in the country
Majak Akec Malok
Was promoted three times in short period from Colonel to Brigadier General and finally to Lieutennant General
Was assigned Director of Nationalities, Passports, and Immigrations, while
While well trained,highly qualified, experienced, competent, skillful  police academy graduate were demoted, laid off and placed on non active list
©Laku's Research Centre 2017








LIST OF DINKA OFFICERS PROMOTED TWICE AND TRIPLE TIMES IN SHORT PERIOD OF TIME








PROMOTIONS: Double and Triple promotions
%


15 out of 34 Police officers promoted are Dinka
44%

9 out of 34 Police officers promoted are citizens o CES
26%

8 out of 34 Police officers promoted are citizens of WES
24%

6 out of 34 Police officers promoted are citizens of Lakes State
18%

5 out of 34 Police officers promoted are not Police Academy graduates (SPLA)
15%

4 out of 34 Police officers promoted are citizens of Warrap State
12%

3 out of 34 Police officers promoted are citizens of Jonglei State
9%

1 out of 34 Police officers promoted is a citizen of NBG State (Dinka)
3%


IRREGULARITIES AND INCONSISTENCES IN PROMOTION




Promotions process are inconsistance with cohort number and graduation year, E.G. senior non-Dinka officers are demoted at lower rank while SPLA Dinka members are promoted to high ranks, assigned and deployed.

Promotions are designed to benefit officers of one ethnic group and SPLA officers

E.G. Col. John Franco cohort 45 and Andrew Koul cohort 47. John was seniro to Andrew, promoted to Colonel and Andrew three time in short period of time to Lt.General



Five SPLA officers were promoted to Maj.Generals, while non-Dinka senior military officers were demoted 








NEPOTISM


3 Dinka Officers are related (Sons in law) to South Sudan Police Chief Lt. Gen Achuil Tito


GENDER

ZERO


SOUTH SUDAN PRISON OFFICERS LIST-ACTIVE AND NON ACTIVE








PRISON OFFICERS ACTIVE AND NON ACTIVE LIST

NOTE

LAID OFF LIST:  Consists of highly qualified experienced and skillful non Dinka Officers

Dr. Eluzai Mogga is holds BA in Edu from University of Juba as well as Diploma in Prison Services Studies from Prison Academy in Khartoum.

Col. Lukudu A. Nicholas, holds Degree in Law from Al-Nileen University in Khartoum, Diploma in Prison Services Studies from Prison Academy in Khartoum, and Teachers Colloge Diploma from Maradi Teachers Institute. 
 teachers 


Promotion Rule of Thumb: Officers o f same cohort receive promotion at the same time except when an indiviudal officer fails exam, traning and fitness, but in S. Sudan promotions based on officer ethnic color. 

The common dinomiator is that-All well trained, qualified, experienced, skillful and competent non-Dinka Officer are either LAID OFF, DEMOTED OR DEPRIVATE OF PROMOTIONS.





5 out of 10 laid off / non active
50%

9 out of 10 deprivate of promotions
90%

10 our 10 faced injustice and discrimination in work place
100%

7 out of 10 deprive of rightful promotions
70%


PROMOTIONS


















IRREGULARITIES AND INCONSISTENCES IN PROMOTION


Promotions are not consistence with cohort number and graduation year, E.G. senior non-Dinka officers are demoted at lower rank while SPLA Dinka members are promoted to high ranks, assigned and deployed.


LIST OF HILGY QUALITIED NON DINKA MILITARY OFFICERS NOT PROMOTED, WITHOUT ASSIGNMENT AND DEPLOYMENT


NOTE
NON ACTIVE LIST-MILITARY













5 out of 5 non-Dinka Medical Doctors and military officers are all citizens of CES
Both Dr. Alphonse and Dr. Luate were placed on non active list without assignments while their juniors Dinka were assigned or responsible for S. Sudan military hospital 
William  Philip Subek is demoted to Sergeant if thought he is a military academy graduate with rank of Officer, while Dinka Officers such as Malong promoted to full General. 
PROMOTIONS














20 out of 66 non-Dinka officers deprive of promotions
30%
25 out of 66 non-Dinka officers deprive of promotions are citizens of CES
38%
7 out of 66 non-Dinka officers deprive of promotions are citizens of EES
11%
4 out of 66 non-Dinka officers deprive of promoitions are citizens of WES
6%
14 out of 66 non-Dinka officers derive of promotions are citizens of UNS
21%
5 out of 66 non-Dinka officer deprive of promotions are members of Murle ethnic group (Jonglei)
7.50%
3 out of 66 non-Dinka officers deprive of promtions are citizens of WBG
4.50%
2 out 66 non-Dinka officers hold Med Degrees and Military Academy
3.00%
1 out of 66 non-Dinka officers deprive of promotions is a member of Nuer ethnic group (Unity)
1.50%
1 out of 66 non-Dinka officers deprive of promtions is a member of Jurchol ethnic group.
1.50%
IRREGULARITIES AND INCONSISTENCES IN PROMOTION
Promotions are not consistence with cohort number and graduation year, E.G. senior non-Dinka officers are demoted at lower rank while SPLA Dinka members are promoted to high ranks, assigned and deployed.
Based on figure above, promotions are designed to eliminate non Dinka officers who are citizens of of the following States: CES, EES, WES, UNS(Shilluk, Nuer and Murle), WBG (Fertit groups), and NBG (Jurchol)
Promotions are designed to get rid of non-Dinka officers with high qualifications, experienced,skillful, competent and  strong academic backgrounds
Non Active list is designed for non-Dinka officers with high qualifications, strong academic backgrounds and competency
Non Active list is designed for non-Dinka officers who are not members of SPLA,i.e. did not fought, but served under Khartoum regime.

List of S. Sudanese Ambassadors in Foreign Missions and Foreign Ministry





NOTE: AMASSADORS



%


23 out of 44 Ambassadors posted Abroad are Dinka
52%

12 out of 23 Ambassadors posted abroad are from Warrap State home state of Kiir
52%

4 out of  44 Abmassadors posted abroad are Nuer
9%

3 out of 44 Abmassadors posted abroad are Shilluk
7%

2 out of 44 Ambassadors postee abroad are Azande
5%

1 out of 44 Abmassador posted abroad is Ma'adi
2.20%

1 out of 43 Ambassador posted abroad is Kuku
2%

1 out of 43 Abmassador posted abroad is Peri
2%


GENDER






Only 6 Female posted Abroad
2

Only 2 Females are Head of Mission

Only 1 Female is Deputy Head of Mission

6 out of 44 Ambassadors posted abroad are female = 14% is less than 25% CPA Quota



ETHNIC REPRESENTATION





SOUTH SUDAN HAS 66 ETHNIC GROUPS AND ONLY 7 REPRESENTED ABROAD

7 out 66 ethnic groups are represented abroad
10%


REGIONS






Only 6 regions represented out of 32 States
19%


©Laku's Research Centre 2017





LIST OF DETAINEES AT SOUTH SUDAN NATIONAL SECURITY









Many other soldiers and civilians in military detention centers in Geida former Aboud ,Luri ,Bilfarm, Guoroum Mafil and former Mayor's Office.





Died in custody













Unconfirmed-death













Deported by Kenyan Govt to Juba












Abducted in Nairobi with the support of Kenyan security authority and transportated to Juba by Road







Important Remarks: Most of the detainees are non Dinka mostly from Equatoria States, followed by WBG State and Jongolei State was only one and released.
Important RemarkS: There is no one detianeeS from Kiir's State, and other Kiir's neigbouring states. This is clearly targeted illegal arrest and detaintions of non- Dinka.
Detainees at SSNS Centres
67 out of 67 detainees denied access to legal attorney
67 out of 67 detainees denied access to medical treatements
67 out of 67 detainees denied access to visitations 
67 out of 67 detainees denied visitations by IRCC
67 out of 67 detainees are in inhuman health conditions
12 out of 67 detainees are citizens of EES
14 out of 67 detainees are citizens of CES
10 out of 67 detainees are citizens of WES
9 out of 67 detainees are citizens of WBG
5 out of 67 detainees are citizens of US
16 out of 67 detainees-unknown States
8 out of 67 detainees died in SSNS custody
3 out of 67 detainees are Officers 
2 out of 67 detainees were abducted in Nairobi by the helped of Kenya national security 
1 out of 67 detainee is politician 
1 out of 67 detainee is a attorney
1 out of 67 detainee was released.Gov. Bakasoro
NOTE 2
On September 29th, 2017 Hon. Betty Achan, M.P., Deputy Co-Chair of SSND was asked about the detainees released by SSNS, she writes this:
Thank you for your mail.  Unfortunately I do not have the list of the released detainees.Sorry, Betty
NOEE 3
THERE IS NO CITIZEN OF THE FOLLOWING STATES IN CUSTODY OF SSNS: WARRAP, JONGLEI, NBG, AND LAKES
THERE IS NO DINKA DETAINEE AT THE CUSTODY OF SSNS.
©Laku's Research Centre2007

19%


Cc:\ IGAD
Cc:\ Members of Troika Member States
Cc:\ Foreign Missions in South Sudan
Cc:\ EU Member States
Cc:\ Members of EU Parliament
Cc:\ Members of US Foreign Relations Committee
Cc:\ Members of US Senate
Cc:\ Members of US House of Representatives
Cc:\ The White House
Cc:\ The USAID
Cc:\ Members of UK House of Commons
Cc:\ Members of Canadian House of Commons
Cc:\ Global Affairs, Canada
Cc:\ USIP
Cc:\ Chatham House
Cc:\ IPI
Cc:\ Major Media channels and newspaper

                  





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