Politicians: The Broken Promises and Trivial Lies

A man decided to run for public office and approached the village Chief, seeking his support. He requested a meeting with local farmers, and the Chief kindly agreed to arrange one so that the candidate could present his agenda to the community—what he would do for them if they voted for him.

 

The Chief arranged a meeting for Saturday afternoon, which was the ideal time, as village farmers take a break before returning to their work in the cooler evening hours. The candidate promised the Chief, along with his senior and junior wives, that if the Chief endorsed him and the people voted for him, he would build a hospital, schools, kindergartens, football fields, and roads to help farmers access the main city’s market, among other developments.

 

On Saturday afternoon, the villagers gathered, and the Chief introduced the candidate, informing them of his intention to represent them in the national parliament. The Chief said he supported the candidate because he believed he would bring economic prosperity to the community but emphasized that the villagers should hear directly from the candidate. The candidate stood up and outlined his vision for the village, including the construction of a hospital, schools, kindergartens, football fields, a community center, roads connecting farmers to the main market, and other improvements.

 

As is customary in many African communities, when the Chief endorses a candidate, no one opposes him, and everyone simply follows the Chief’s lead. This was the case, and the candidate was elected to represent the village in the national parliament. Once elected, the candidate left the village and became accustomed to city life, not returning for more than five years. He never implemented any of the promised projects and completely forgot his pledges to the community.

 

When his first term ended and the election date approached, he returned to the village and immediately went to the Chief, informing him that he planned to run for a second term and would appreciate the Chief’s support once again. He asked the Chief to arrange another meeting with the villagers so he could convince them to vote for him again. The Chief agreed, saying, “No problem; I’ll arrange a meeting for you with the village residents on Saturday afternoon.”

The candidate thanked the Chief and left, but a few minutes later, he returned, saying, “Chief, I realized you didn’t specify where we will meet.” The Chief calmly replied, “We will meet in the school you built for us.”

 

The message was clear: the Chief was signaling that he would not be supporting the candidate this time. The candidate’s failure to fulfill his promises had removed any trust the Chief or the villagers might have had in him. The story illustrates how many politicians, especially during election seasons, make grand promises to win votes, only to abandon those promises once they are in power. After they win, they disappear, leaving the people who trusted them behind.

 

This scenario mirrors what will happen in the upcoming federal elections in Canada in the spring of 2025, especially within the Afro-Canadian and Afro-Caribbean communities. Many dishonest politicians and MPs will offer false hope to secure diaspora votes, only to betray those same communities once they gain office. Once in power, these politicians disappear from the communities they promised to help, making themselves unreachable by phone or email, and failing to attend community rallies or support the suffering populations in countries such as Haiti, Chad, Congo, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and others.

 

The Afro-Canadian MPs, in particular, have a disappointing track record in supporting Afro-Canadian diaspora projects and events like Kwanzaa or advocating for economic development in Africa and the Caribbean. Some MPs have even gone as far as discouraging African youth from seeking a better life in Canada, advising them that Canada is not a good place to be. It is shocking to see that in many cases, your own face is missing from their offices.

 

In the upcoming federal elections, it is crucial to vote based on rationality, conscience, and the track record of MPs. Do not vote for MPs with a negative history in the expatriate community. Diaspora members must not be swayed by empty promises or false hope. Politicians who do not genuinely represent the people should be avoided. In essence, some MPs do not represent the people; they represent themselves opportunistically through the people’s votes. Don’t be fooled or duped. The recommendation is to vote carefully for politicians who embody the core principles of the Afro-Canadian and Afro-Caribbean diaspora and are genuinely committed to making a positive difference in African-descendant communities while advocating for Africa and the Caribbean. It appears that many new Afro-Canadian MPs in the Canadian Parliament have absorbed the flawed thinking of the old political guard, dating back to early 2003.

 

The key message for the Afro-Canadian and Afro-Caribbean diaspora is to take the initiative and represent themselves in the national parliament. It’s time to stop being followers and instead create our own opportunities for change. The Afro-Canadian diaspora must become active participants in the political structure of power. To accomplish this, diaspora members must organize, unite, and develop a common agenda. Leaders of Afro-Canadian organizations should meet, build trust, and work together to create a unified purpose. The diaspora should educate its members on civic engagement, political participation, party membership, fundraising, campaign strategies, and canvassing. The time for complaints is over. It is time for action.

 

I also want to share my negative experiences with the majority of current Afro-Canadian and Afro-Caribbean MPs. As many of you know, I run an internship program for African heritage students in Canadian universities. In May 2024, I reached out to all the current Afro-Canadian MPs, offering my support for the initiative and offering to assist with placing interns for the summer. Only one of out the seven Liberal MPs responded positively, and the single PC MP did not respond at all. The only Liberal MP who did reply agreed to meet with the interns' board and promised to share the interns’ resumes with colleagues for potential summer jobs. However, after sending the resumes and cover letters to his office in May, the board never heard back from him. The Board Chair and program coordinator attempted to contact his offices multiple times but received no response. This clearly shows the lack of regard the MP had for the Afro-Canadian community, and its initiatives, the professors and the community leaders.

 

The reality is that the enemy of the Afro-Canadian diaspora often resides within the diaspora itself. The current Afro-Canadian MPs and Senators have disappointing records when it comes to issues affecting the diaspora, Africa, and the Caribbean.

 

Liberal MPs:

1. Hedy Frey
2. Michael Coteau
3. Emmanuel Dubourg
4. Greg Fergus, First Afro-Canadian Speaker of the House
5. Ahmed Hussein
6. Merci Ien &
7. Arielle Kayabaga

PC MP:

1. Leslyn Ann Lewis

Senators:

1. Bernadette Clement
2. Amina Gerba
3. Dr. Wanda Thomas Bernard
4. Sharon Burey
5. Marie-Françoise Mégie
6. Paulette Senior &
7. Suze Youance

 

Surprisingly, the internship program received strong support from non-Afro-Canadian MPs such as Hon. Yasir Naqvi and Chandra Arya, who have been great friends of the Afro-Canadian and Afro-Caribbean diaspora. They are always available to meet, listen, and support diaspora initiatives—something the Afro-Canadian MPs have largely failed to do. Both Yasir and Chandra are following footsteps of the late Hon. David Kilgour, PC., M.P., Hon. Jason Kenney, M.P., Dr. Maurice Vellacott, M.P., Prof. Irwin Colter, M.P., Vivian Barbot, M.P., Hon. Stockwell Day, M.P., Hon. Chuck Strahl, M.P., Alexa McDonough, M.P., Francine Lalonde, M.P, and Anthony Dube.

 

In my own experience, I visited my own MPs’ constituency offices in Hull over three times, requesting meetings, and yet received no response. When I last visited, I made it clear to the MP's assistant that the MP would need to earn my support, the support of my diaspora communities if he expected our votes in the next election-it is payback time.

 

The reality is that some MPs who were voted in have distanced themselves from the communities that elected them. They do not return, they do not listen, and they do not care about the people who helped them get into office.

 

The Harper government, led by Hon. Jason Kenney, demonstrated a strong commitment to the Afro-Canadian diaspora, working closely with the community and the internship program. Minister Kenney fully supported the initiative in 2008 and 2009, hiring 40 interns for paid summer positions and support the vision and objectives of African diaspora Association of Canada (ADAC)—a stark contrast to the neglect shown by some current MPs.

 

The goal here is to provide evidence-based facts and lessons learned to help the diaspora make informed decisions and avoid being deceived by politicians who take the Afro-Canadian diaspora votes for granted. The enemy of the diaspora is often found within the diaspora itself. Education is key to preventing future failure (My people will perish due to a lack of education-Hosea 6:4). It’s now up to the diaspora to make the necessary changes for the benefit of future generations.

 

In conclusion, the time has come for Afro-Canadians to take an active role in the national parliamentary system. The diaspora must organize, unite, and develop a unified agenda. Afro-Canadian organizations must work together, educate their communities, and focus on positive actions rather than complaints. The time for entertainment and inaction is over. It is time for change.

 

© Hüstin Läkü, SR

Is a graduate of Institute of Federalism, University of Fribourg, Switzerland, Former staff member of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, advisor to Hon. David Kilgour, M.P, P.C., Secretary of State for Africa and Latin America in Ottawa, Canada, an international Observer South Sudan Peace Talks in 2014 in Addis Ababa, and Co-founder of the Canadian Friends of Sudan.

 

Re: Member of ACAO: High Priority

Hi all,

I trust you had a wonderful Christmas and NY celebrations full of fun!

I hope some of you recall my posts on here in June and September 18th, 2024, on the Lib Party leadership crisis and possibly early elections in the spring of 2025, which turned out to be true.

The million-dollar question still stands: Are Afro-Canadian/Afro-Caribbean diaspora members prepared to face the issue of identifying their own candidates to run for public office or seek nomination? Are Afro-Canadian/Afro-Caribbean born Canadians educating their members about civic involvement, party membership, campaigns, and voter registration, volunteering? Identify and support them to represent their interests in the Commons, or are they still stuck in the old paradigm of supporting non-Afro-Canadians to represent them and their interests in the commons, or wishing for non-Afro-Canadian candidates to represent their interests in the commons? I leave it to you to determine and act on this matter for the sake of future generations of Afro-Canadian/Afro-Caribbean young leaders.

P.S. please, consult the screenshots for June and Sept 2024 messages.

Below is my messages to 

Dear Member of ACAO:  

Greetings to you all in the name of God of Africa, May He/She protect you and give you the wisdom to lead the Afro-Canadians to a better future in Canada.  

I trust all is well with you and that you're in good spirits.

I am humbled by your kind and encouraging comments, as well as brotherly and sisterly support during the 2024 ACAO multicultural festival/ football torment; thank you everyone for being true friends in times of need.

I will do my best to help advance the ACAO's vision, objectives, and mission in the nation's capital.

As I discussed with John last April 2024, there is a need to educate Afro-Canadian students and youngsters about educational, national, and worldwide job options available to them.

Additionally, the federal elections may be held early next year. The question is if the afro-Canadians and Afro-Caribbean Canadians are willing to influence the system in order to attain the goals and objectives of the Afro-Canadians diaspora.

ACAO can begin with civic engagement efforts to educate diaspora groups on the importance of voting, party membership, campaigns, and participating in the political process. This is fodder for thinking.

It's time for the Afro-Canadians diaspora to take the initiative and represent themselves at all levels of government in Canada.

John, I am still working on my FIFA certification, which was delayed due to Covid-19, so I am not finished yet.

May God’s richest blessings be on your lives and works.

©Hustin

July 6^th,2024

True Greatest Heroes of South Sudan Video

 

Fraught Sudan poll imperils democracy

 

Fraught Sudan poll imperils democracy

By Justin Laku

Sudanese democracy is being killed by multiple assassins, writes Justun Laku.

Election rigging and voter frauds, such as the ones allegedly took place in that Sudan this past week during the first multiparty elections in 24 years, are all clear indications of an unfair, non-free, non-transparent, non-credible, and non-inclusive election held in the absence of the rule of law.

Sudanese democracy is being killed by multiple assassins: the National Election Commission (NEC), President Omar al-Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-Democratic Change (SPLM).

Each of these three suspects in the election-rigging game has had a hand in unfair elections and, indeed, has contributed to the death of democracy in Sudan. The NEC in the north, by its decision to print presidential ballots in a government-owned printing press, opened the door to rigging and possible fraud in the creation of election materials. On the part of the NCP, its use of oil money and public services to fund campaigns is a crass destruction of the democratic process and a trampling of Islamic laws. And the SPLM’s harassment of independent candidates and orders handed down to ban the activities of its breakaway faction, the SPLM Democratic Change, are an added false start to the work of democratization in Sudan.

Democracy in Sudan is not yet fully dead; there are still signs of life and hope. Yes, it is true that first aid is required to give it life through recounts and the cross-referencing of voter lists with actual votes cast in areas where irregularities allegedly occurred.

But this unfair election may cause more harm than good to both the SPLM and the NCP, as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) partnership, as well as the road to the 2011 South Sudan referendum on independence, will be made that much more difficult. The indicators on the ground suggest that most of the south will vote for separation, even thought the north is trying its best to make continued unity attractive at all costs.

So what does democracy mean to the Sudanese — and, in fact, the continent? African leaders inherited democracy from colonial masters without understanding the concept behind it. In essence democracy, as applied in Sudan, is tantamount to a “copy-and-paste” of Western democracy and lacks solid beliefs, values and processes that are meaningful to the locals. As a result, these artificial applications of democracy remain vulnerable to the instinctive impulse of tribalism.

Democracy in Sudan is rife with tribalism, ethnic nepotism and ethnic favoritism. The only way ahead is one of equality, acceptance, respect, freedom, separation of religion from state, reconciliation, awareness of common values, responsibility for the country’s other cultures, and law enforcement against corruption and other ills besetting this nation.

Justin Laku is a founding member of the African Diaspora Association the founder of The Friends of Sudan

Tags: Sudanese Elections

https://mg.co.za/article/2010-04-22-fraught-sudan-poll-imperils-democracy/

The article was first published on 22 APRIL 2010

The Tribal Police Force in South Sudan

SUMMARY 

This study examines the appointments, promotions, postings, and deployments of the Inspector General of Police (IGP) within the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) from 2005 to the present. It appears that most of the time, these decisions are made based more on relationships to President Kiir, First Vice President Machar, or IGPs than on job merit, credentials, experiences, or accomplishments. This does not seem to represent the national character of the nation. The course of events has demonstrated that SSPS devalues professional seniority and disparages senior officers and non-commission staff who have several years of training and work experience in the former Sudan. The majority of competent and experienced police officers are denied promotions, demoted, or forced into retirement and placed to non-active list.

In addition, the SSPS has earned the reputation of being a "tribal police force" and is devoid of professionalism and expertise in policing, which is predicated on a dedication to providing safety, protection, and crime prevention. The SSPS lacks the capacity to safeguard people's assets and lands and to ensure public safety in a manner that is sustainable, legal, and efficient.

Furthermore, this essay contends that since modern democracy is about promoting democratic advancement, fundamental freedoms, and effective governance, police should not have the job of stifling democratic ideals. The next 2024 planned general elections will demonstrate Kiir's tribal police policies and actions, as organized forces will play a key role and be used to conceal any voting violations. Election officials, citizens, political parties, and civil rights advocates will all be coerced into allowing election tampering and establishing Kiir as president for life.

Finally, the information gathered demonstrates that, ever since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) era, members of the Dinka ethnic group have led and dominated the positions of IGP and Director General of Police in the following states: Central Equatoria State (CES), Eastern Equatoria State (EES), Western Equatoria State (WES), Northern Bahar Al-Ghazal (NBG) State, and Western Bahar Al-Ghazal (WBG). Members of the Nuer ethnic group have been deputized in these roles. Limiting Kiir's unrestricted executive powers and ending tribal police under the federal Constitution—which states that police are subject to state jurisdiction—are the best course of action and the best course of action for the nation.

 

ABBREVIATIONS

AG                Attorney General 

CES               Central Equatoria State

CPA               Comprehensive Peace Agreement

DDP               Dinka Development Plan

EES                Eastern Equatoria State

EHN               Equatoria house niggers

IGP                 Inspector General of Police

MP                  Member of Parliament

NIF                  National Islamic Front

NBG                Northern Bahar Al-Ghazal  

NSS                  National Security Service 

PSC                  Police service council

SSACGP          Southern Sudanese Assistant Commissioner General of Police 

SSLM               Southern Sudan Liberation Movement

SNPS                Sudan National Police Service

SSNPS              South Sudan National Police Service

SSPSA              Southern Sudan Police Service Act

SPF                   Sudanese Police forces

SPLA/M           Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement

SPLA/IO         Sudan People’s Liberation Army/in Opposition

SSPS                Southern Sudan Police Services

UNMISS          United Nations Mission in South Sudan

WBG               Western Bahar Al-Ghazal

WES                Western Equatoria State

HISTORY

THE 2009 SOUTHERN SUDAN POLICE SERVICE ACT

2009 saw the enactment of the Southern Sudan Police Service Act (SSPSA). The previous Sudan National Police Act is copied verbatim from Arabic and hasn't been changed since the country's independence. Its goals are to safeguard residents and their property, prevent, investigate, and combat crime; furthermore, it aims to respect and execute the 2005 Southern Sudan Interim Constitution (SSPS Act, 2005).

Since the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) was established, its principal duties have been to protect public safety, uphold the rule of law, and, with some degree of integrity and compliance with both domestic and international regulations, Although police responsibilities seem lofty in theory, they are conspicuously absent from the nation's police force's daily operations (ibid.). 

OVERVIEW

The SSPSA is the source of the malfunctioning SSPS. The Act was drafted by lawmakers with little experience or familiarity with 21st-century law enforcement. There are many uncertainties and terminology gaps throughout the Act. For example, the Act talked about the police service council (PSC) and the state police, but in actuality, neither organization exists at the state level across the entire country. The PSC's mission and scope of work, the hiring procedure, state quotas, and recruitment procedures are all left vague in the Act. The function of recruitment centers at the national and state levels is not discussed. The Act specified the minimal educational need but left out details about higher qualifications, such as the hiring requirements for MA and Ph.D. holders. Although basic training is one of the prerequisites for aspiring officers before certification, education is essential for progress and promotion.

Furthermore, seniority is listed as a criterion in the Act, but in practice, highly competent and senior officers were not assigned, promoted, or even deployed. For example, former IGP Gen. Majak Akech and his successor, Atem Moraul, were junior officers and captains under senior officers who were not Dinka/Nuer, but they were promoted at a rapid rate in a way that rendered them superior to their subordinates and, to some extent, to their former superiors. Additionally, non-Dinka/Nuer SPLA senior officers who have completed years of training, experience, and education in the military, police, prison, wildlife, and customs academies are routinely denied promotions, leadership roles, assignments, and deployments that they are due and are instead forced to retire. The misfortune of South Sudan could be described as follows: the qualified, inexperienced, ill-trained, and potentially illiterate are not only promoted but also given important assignments, while those with knowledge and experience are subjected to discrimination, unfair treatments, and institutionalized marginalization. They are frequently given positions of power and unrestricted access, which they then exploit to assassinate and forcibly remove a number of legitimate landowners from their ancestral homes. Check also Administrative Corruption, Nepotism, Injustice, and Discrimination in South Sudan for further information on the problems surrounding promotions, assignments, and deployments.

Tribal ties and alliances with the President, First Vice President, and IGP are the primary criteria used for SSPS promotions. Promotions, assignments, and deployments do not represent the national character of the nation and are not determined by job merit, credentials, experiences, or accomplishments. Professional seniority is not valued by the SSPS, which also disparages senior officers and non-commission staff who have several years of training and work experience in the former Sudan. For instance, Kon John Akot, the current director of traffic police in Juba, was officer Cedet at the Sudanese Military Academy in Khartoum and fired. He founded an opposition party in Cairo in the early 1990s to oppose the Khartoum regime, and he later returned to Sudan for personal reasons. The MPs recently called for the Minister of Interior and the IGP to appear before the Parliament and respond to Akon's illegal traffic orders & directives (Consult Hon. Simon Kun Puoch of November 13, 2023); John too is Kiir’s relative. At a time when the nation is facing a shortage in the retention of well-trained and qualified senior officers who could contribute to advancing the goals and vision of policing and community policing, cyber and peace officers, and the professionalization of the SSPS, the majority of highly qualified officers are either denied promotions, demoted, or forced to retire. Community policing is mentioned in passing in the SSPSA, but its definition, vision, goal, and objectives are not included in the Act.

According to COPS (2014), community policing is a philosophy that encourages organizational strategies that support the methodical application of collaborations and problem-solving methods to proactively address the immediate causes of public safety issues like crime, social disorder, and fear of crime. 

EXAMINING 

The overarching strategy of Kiir's organized forces (SSPDF, SSPS, NSS, Correction Service, Customs, Wildlife, and and Fire Brigade) is to undercut the backgrounds, expertise, and qualifications of highly skilled and qualified officers, as well as graduates of the Police Academy and holders of BA, MA, and Ph.D. degrees. Kiir's intended organized forces policy is to demote and retire competent, well-trained, qualified, and experienced officers, particularly Equatoria senior Officer who are medically and physically fit and those who assisted in the establishment of the Southern Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS), and to promote, assign, and deploy illiterate and corrupt SPLA officers in positions of authority with unlimited powers. Furthermore, Kiir's tribal police strategy is intended to evade responsibility and to further the nation's tribalism, corruption, nepotism, marginalization, and prejudice.

The results of Kiir's tribal police program will be evident in the upcoming general elections in 2024, where voters will be intimidated and organized troops will be used to conceal irregularities in the voting process. In order to carry out the Dinka Development Plan (DDP), Kiir is assigning his tribe SPLA commanders to important leadership roles within organized troops, giving them unrestricted autonomy. Depopulation of Collo, Fertits, and Equatorians from their native areas is one of DDP's goals. The legitimate owners of lands in Collo, Fertits, and Equatoria are being forcibly removed, and the IGP and certain SPLA generals are abusing their unrestricted power and authority to do so (for more information on the issues surrounding illegal removal, see Annex 1 and Michael Rial Christopher's live video from August 6, 2023). Due to a lack of professionalism in policing to investigate land corruption, some of the Central Equatoria House niggers¹ and Arua Boys², who hold important positions in the CES government, particularly the Governor and Mayor Office, the Ministry of Housing, the Land Commission, the Court, Ministry of Injustice, Attorney General and the Local Chiefs Office, are helping to facilitate the illegal removal of rightful owners from their lands in Malakal, Waw, and Equatoria. 

Lacking a "new professionalism" in policing founded on a dedication to responsibility, public legitimacy, innovation, and national coherence, the SSPS is a tribal force. The SSPS is unable to provide individuals with public safety and lawful, sustainable methods of protecting their homes and lands.

The following issues are blamed for the SSP force's well-known brutality, corruption, thefts, and other crimes, as well as its endemic sloth: The following are the reasons for this: (1) the Constitution gives the President unrestricted authority to appoint, promote, and assign illiterate, untrained, and inexperienced officers to positions of authority and to lead professional organizations; (2) lawmakers rubberstamp laws without understanding the Police Act, policing, community policing, Cyber and Peace Officers and their functions, IGP and Police Commissioner Terms of References; (3) appointments, promotions, and recruitments of IGPs are made based on tribal lines rather than qualifications, experience, and job merit; (4) the SSPSA doesn't specify the qualifications and job merits for IGPs and Assistant IGPs appointments and (5) Since the CPA era and the nation's post-independence period, Dinka people have led and dominated the role of IGP, Director General of Police, in the CES, EES, WES, WBG, and NBG States, with Nuer ethnic people serving as deputies.

The SSPS has fallen short in several areas, including citizen security, public order maintenance, law enforcement, impartiality and honesty, noncompliance with the law, and a lack of professionalism in policing grounded in public accountability, legitimacy with the public, innovation, and national coherence. 

FINAL REMARKS

These days, modern policing is about being accountable to the people, being legitimate, being innovative, and fostering national cohesion. Since modern democracy is about excellent governance, the role of police in a democracy is not to stifle democratic traditions; rather, professionalism in law enforcement advances democratic advancement.

The SSPS's current mission is to defend the interests of Kiir and his clan, who control the country. It is not held accountable to the public for crimes committed, nor does it offer an apology for policy or action misbehavior. Under the Kiir regime, the SPLM political party controls and manipulates policing, and SSPS has close ties to SPLM political organization. Regarding accountability, legitimacy, and national cohesion, the SSP has no notion whatsoever. The SSP is a tribal organization rather than a national one. Limiting Kiir's unrestricted executive powers and ending tribal police under the federal Constitution—which places police under state and county jurisdictions—are the best course of action and the best course of action for the nation (for more information on federal, state, and county police, see Annex 2).

PROFILES OF POLICE INSPECTOR GENERALS & DEPUTIES

1.    General Makuei Deng is a member of the Dinka Bor ethnic group from Jonglei State. He belonged to the Anya Nya 1, formally known the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), and later joined the Sudan Police Forces (SPF). He completes his law enforcement studies at the Sudanese Police Academy in Khartoum. Under the leadership of Abel Alier as President of the High Executive Council and Ruben Mac as Police Inspector General, Makuei gained notoriety for engaging in the systematic mistreatment of Equatoria civilians in Juba. Abel's time in the office was mostly marked by negative political practices, including nepotism, tribalism, and a sense of entitlement. Additionally, there were instances of cruelty towards the indigenous communities of Equatoria, which, among other causes, contributed to the occurrence of Kokora⁴. The implementation of the Kokora strategy is considered to be one of the factors that impacted the formation of the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). Makuei defected from the Sudanese Police forces (SPF) and joined the SPLA/M in 1983, at the rank of Colonel. He assumed the position of the first Inspector General (IGP) of the Southern Sudan Police Services (SSPS) in 2005 and served until 2010. 

2.    General David Aguer was appointed as the deputy to Deng by Kiir. General Aguer is a member of the Anyuak ethnic group from Pachala in Jonglei State. Gen. Ageur completed his law enforcement education at the Police Academy in Sudan as part of cohort 35. General Aguer held the position of the inaugural Assistant Commissioner General of Police (SSACGP) in Juba, representing the southern region of Sudan. During the Post Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, he, along with other high-ranking Southern Sudanese officers, was assigned to Juba with the objective of establishing the Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS). Moreover, David was responsible for overseeing the SSPS recruitment service. General Aguer held many positions at both the state and national levels. He formerly held the position of First Assistant Commissioner General of Police in Sudan and has also served as a Minister. During the era of decentralization in 1983, he was two terms Province Commissioner in Upper Nile region. Currently, he is a Member of Parliament (MP) in Juba and served as Chair for Defence and Security Committee. General Aguer is the sole individual of non-Dinka/Nuer ethnicity to have held a prominent position within the South Sudanese People's Security Services.

3.    Gen. Achuil Tito Manawoly is a member of the Dinka ethnic group from the Kwac village in Warrap state. Achuil was a member of the 42nd cohort of the Sudanese Police Academy in Khartoum. In 1983, he became a member of SPLA/M. He held the position of Second IGP, serving from 2009 to 2013. Achuil's tenure was marked by a significant prevalence of corruption, nepotism, tribalism, and the unjustified elevation of unqualified individuals selected from the Achuil Boys Club5 roster. The non active list was late Achuils’ innovation and it is unconstitutional, unlawful and nowhere to be seen in the SSP Act and Regulations of 2009 or police policy.

4.    Gen. Gordon Kur Micha deputized Late Achuil. General Micha is a member of the Dinka Bor ethnic group, which is located in Jonglei State. Gordon completed his law enforcement studies at the Sudanese Police Academy in Khartoum as part of cohort 42, rather than being affiliated with the SPLA. In 1989, he was expelled for reasons related to the public welfare by the Khartoum regime of National Islamic Front (NIF).  During the early 1990s, he sought asylum in the Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE) and was subsequently relocated to Ottawa, Canada. Following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), he repatriated to Sudan and was reinstated to the South Sudanese Police Service (SSPS) with the rank of Brigadier General in 2007. His tenure was from 2010 until 2013.   

5.    Gen. Pieng Deng Kuol is a member of the Dinka Ngok ethnic group in Abeyi. Pieng is the sibling of Dr. Francis Deng, Dr. Biong, and Deng Alor. Pieng lacks the credentials of a Sudanese Police Academy graduate and possesses no expertise in the field of police. He enrolled as an engineering student at Khartoum University in Sudan, but did not finish and became a member of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) at the beginning of 1983. Pieng held many positions, including the role of deputy Chief of General Staff for finance and administration in the South Sudan People's Army (SPLA). Pieng held the position of the Third Inspector General of Police (IGP) from 2013 to 2016.

6.    General Andrew Kuol Nyon was appointed as a deputy to Pieng by Kiir. General Nyon is a member of the Dinka Bor ethnic group in Jonglei State. General Kuol obtained his law enforcement certification from the Sudanese Police Academy in Khartoum as part of the 47th cohort. General Kuol joined the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) right after graduation from Police Academy with rank of 2Lt. He is presently in charge of the small weapons division.

7.    Gen. Makur Maroul is a member of the Dinka ethnic group from Cuiebeit in Lakes State. Makur completed his law enforcement studies at the Sudanese Police Academy in Khartoum as part of the 42nd batch. Makur was one of the Southern Sudanese Officers who were relocated from the Police headquarters in Khartoum to Juba under the direction of Gen. Aguer in order to form the Southern Sudanese Police Service (SSPS). He is a person with privileged access and held the position for duration of barely nine months. Makur was handpicked from retirees list by Kiir and appointed as the Inspector General of Police (IGP) from a group of Dinka officers in the SSPS. He held the position of the Fourth and served a term of nine months in office.

8.   Gen. James Beil is member of Nuer ethnic group from Unity State and was appointed by Kiir as a deputy to Makur. He is affiliated with the SPLA-IO group led by Taban Deng.

9.    Gen. Saeed Chawul Lom is a member of the Dinka ethnic group from Rumbek in Lakes State. He has successfully completed the Police academy studies in Sudan as part of cohort 47. He was terminated on two occasions while serving as Captain and LCol by the Khartoum regime. While he was in office, there was an allegation that the stolen United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) vehicle was discovered at his residence in Juba.  Like the last Inspector General of Police (IGP), Saeed was personally handpicked from retirees list by Kiir and officially installed as the IGP. Saeed served as the Fifth Inspector General of Police (IGP) for duration of nine months

10.General James Pio is a member of Nuer ethnic group from Unity State was appointed by Kiir as a deputy to Saeed. The Nuer General is affiliated with the SPLA-IO group led by General Taban Deng.

11. Gen. Majak Akech Malok is a member of the Dinka ethnic group from Lakes State. He is SPLA officer; however, he did not attend the Sudanese Police Academy in Khartoum and lacks any expertise or understanding in the field of police. At first, Majak had the rank of Captain, then Late Achuil elevated him to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. In a little span of time, he swiftly ascended by Kiir to the rank of Lieutenant General and assumed the role of Director General of the Civil Registry Nationalities, Passports, and Immigration Directorate. He is a member of the Achuil Corrupt Boys Club (aka Sgt Boys). He is the sibling of Paul Mayoum Akech, who previously served as a Minister and Member of Parliament.

12. General Jal Thomas was appointed deputy to Majak by Kiir. General Thomas is a member of the Nuer ethnic group in Unity State. Gen. Thomas is an alumnus of the Sudanese Police Academy in Khartoum and has obtained a Master's degree in Peace studies from the University of Juba. Gen. Thomas is affiliated with the SPLA/IO side led by Dr. Riak Machar.

13. Gen. Atem Morol Biar is a member of the Dinka Bor ethnic group in Jonglei State. He is an SPLA soldier without education, training, and expertise in law enforcement. He is a member of the recently Achui Corrupt Boys Club (aka Sgt Boys). Late Achuil recommended him, and Kiir advanced him from the rank of Colonel to Major General, along with several others. Prior to this, he held the position of Director General at the Directorate of Civil Registry, Nationality Passports, and Immigration within the Interior Ministry.

TABLES

NO.	RANK/ NAME	STATE	ETHNICITY	BACKGROUND	REMARKS
1.	Gen. Makuei Deng	Jonglei	Dinka	Anya Nya/ SPLA
2.	Late Gen. Acuil Tito Madut	Warrap	Dinka	Police Academy/ & SPLA
3.	Gen. Pieng Deng Kuol	Abyei	Dinka	SPLA/ not a Police Academy graduate
4.	Gen.Makur Maroul	Lakes	Dinka	Graduate of Police Academy
5.	Gen. Saeed Chawul Lom	Lakes	Dinka	Graduate of Police Academy
6.	Gen. Majak Akech Malok	Lakes	Dinka	SPLA/ not a Police Academy graduate
7.	Gen. Atem Morol Biar	Jonglei	Dinka	SPLA/ not a Police Academy graduate

 

DEPUTY IGPS

NO.	RANK/ NAME	STATE	ETHNICITY	BACKGROUND	REMARKS
1.	Gen. David Aguer	Jonglei	Anyuak	Graduate of Police Academy	The only non-Dinka/Nuer served in the higher portfolio of the SSNPS.
2.	Gen. Gordon Kur Micha	Jonglei	Dinka	Police Academy/ SPLA/non SPLA
3.	Gen. Andrew Kual Nyon	Jonglei	Dinka	Graduate of Police Academy & SPLA
4.	Gen. James Biel	Unity	Nuer	IO
5.	Gen. James Pio	Unity	Nuer	IO
6.	Gen. Jal Thomas	Unity	Nuer	Graduate of Police Academy & SPLA/IO
7.	Gen. Jal Thomas	Unity	Nuer	Graduate of Police Academy & SPLA/IO

DATA DON’T LIE

LIST OF IGPs BY STATE (2023)

State	CES	EES	WES	JS	Unity	UN	LS	WS	WBG	NBG	ABYEI
No of IGPs	0	0	0	2	0	0	3	1	0	0	1
Percentage %	0%	0%	0%	28.5%	0%	0%	42.8%	14%	0%	0%	14.2%

*Jonglei one, Lakes three, Warrap one, and Abeyi one.

LIST OF DEPUTY IGPs BY STATE (2023)

State	CES	EES	WES	JS	Unity	UN	LS	WS	WBG	NBG	ABYEI
No of IGPs	0	0	0	3	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Percentage %	0%	0%	0%	43%	57.1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

*One non-Dinka/Nuer, two Dinkas, and three Nuers

LIST OF IGPS BY PERCENTAGE (2023)

Item	Female	Male	Remarks
No.	0	7	N/A
Percentage %	0%	100%	N/A

 

 

*Seven out of seven Dinka         

 

LIST OF IGP & DEPUTY IGPS BY GENDER (2023)

Item	Female	Male	Remarks
No.	0	7	N/A
Percentage %	0%	100%	N/A

 

 

*Zero female and seven male

LIST OF IGPs & DEPUTY IGPS BY ETHNICITIES (2023)

No.	Ethnicity	No of IGP/DIGP	Percentage %	No.	Ethnicity	No of IGP/DIGP	Percentage %
1.	Acholi	0	0%	39.	Makaraka	0	0%
2.	Aja	0	0%	40.	Mananger	0	0%
3.	Anyuak (D/IGP)	1	14.2%	41.	Mangayat	0	0%
4.	Atuot (Reel)	0	0%	42.	Muru	0	0%
5.	Avukaya	0	0%	43.	Moro Kodo	0	0%
6.	Azande	0	0%	44.	Mundari	0	0%
7.	Bai	0	0%	45.	Mundu	0	0%
8.	Baka	0	0%	46.	Murle	0	0%
9.	Balanda-Boor	0	0%	47	Ndogo	0	0%
10.	Balanda- Viri	0	0%	48.	Ngulngule	0	0%
11.	Banda	0	0%	49.	Nuer (D/IGP)	4	57.1%
12.	Bari	0	0%	50.	Nyangatom	0	0%
13.	Binga	0	0%	51.	Yangwara	0	0%
14.	Bongo	0	0%	52.	Otuho	0	0%
15.	Boya (Larim is their village)	0	0%	53.	Pari	0	0%
16.	Didinga	0	0%	54.	Pojulu	0	0%
17.	Dinka Dinka	7 IGP 2 D/IGP	100% 28.5%	55.	Sere	0	0%
18.	Dongatona	0	0%	56.	Shaaya	0	0%
19.	Falata (Arab Nomads)	0	0%	57.	Shilluk (Chollo)	0	0%
20.	Feroghe	0	0%	58.	Suri (Kachipo)	0	0%
21.	Collo	0	0%	59.	Tid	0	0%
22.	Horiok/ Horyok	0	0%	60.	Toposa	0	0%
23.	Indri	0	0%	61..	Uduk	0	0%
24.	Jiye (Jie)	0	0%	62.	Woro	0	0%
25.	Jur (Bell & Modo)	0	0%	63.	Yulu	0	0%
26.	Jurchol	0	0%	64.		0	0%
27..	Kakwa	0	0%
28.	Kara	0	0%
29.	Keliku	0	0%	.
30.	Kresh	0	0%
32.	Kuku	0	0%
33.	Lango	0	0%
34.	Lopit	0	0%
35.	Lugbwara	0	0%
36.	Lolubo	0	0%
37.	Maban	0	0%
38.	Ma’adi	0	0%

THE LIST IS INCOMPLETE 2023

*One Anyuak, two Dinkas, and four Nuers

 

Endnotes:

1. Equatoria house niggers (EHN) refer to some public officials in the Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, and Western Equatoria administrations who are recognized for their involvement in the illicit sale of government residences, lands, assets, and natural resources to individuals or groups that pose a threat to the interests of South Sudan. They occupy influential positions inside the CE government, Ministry of Housing, Land Commission, Equatoria Members of Parliament at the national and state levels, as well as within the Court and local Chiefs offices. 

2. Arua boys is a collective of exiles from CES, with some of them having never seen Juba before 2005. During the conflict, they were refugees’ individuals seeking safety in Uganda. They were known as the Arua Boys and were often spotted at Arua Park, which served as a hub for gatherings, commerce, and occasionally, aimless wandering. At present, some of Arua boys have hijacked and taken control of the CE government key positions. They engage in illicit displacement of legitimate landowners in Juba, utilizing their positions of authority to coerce and instill fear, resulting in the targeted killing of vulnerable women in Juba. For further information, please refer to the live video by Michael Christopher on Facebook, broadcasted on August 6, 2023.

3. The Anyanya were a faction of separatist rebels in Southern Sudan that emerged during the initial phase of the First Sudanese Civil War. Another distinct movement that emerged during the Second Sudanese Civil War was SPLA.

4. Kokora is synonymous with the act of dividing. Kokora is a term used in the Karo language. The Karo-speaking ethnic group is located in the Central Equatoria region. The ethnic groups include Bari, Mandari, Nyangwara, Kuku, Kakwa, and Pojulu. Kokora is a term that denotes the act of dividing or the concept of division. For example, if you possess a single loaf of bread and have two offspring, what actions would you take to ensure fairness? Divide it evenly by giving one to each youngster, breaking it in the middle. Socially, equity refers to the fair and equitable distribution of resources, while in governance; it denotes the allocation of power among different levels of governments.

5. The Achuil Boys Club, often known as the Sgt boys, is a collective of young officers who are affiliated with the late General Achuil.

REFERENCES

1.    Administrative Corruption, Nepotism, Injustice and Discrimination in South Sudan: Retrieved from

https://africanissuesinfocus.blogspot.com/2017/12/opted-title-administrative-corruption.html, on Nov 13^th, 2023

2. Presidential Decrees copies
3. State Police: Retrieved from https://www.allcriminaljusticeschools.com/law-enforcement/ on Dec 3, 2023

4.    The Southern Sudan Police Service Act, 2009: Retrieved from https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/MONOGRAPH/98165/116701/F492083151/SSD98165.pdf, On Nov 23, 2023

5.    The COPS 2014: Retrieved from www.cops.usdoj.gov, on Nov 23^th, 2023;

6.    The illegal removal and land grabbing in Jabal Nogka in Juba: Retrieved from https://fb.watch/oHAn-I5EvB/?mibextid=2Rb1fB on Aug 6,2023 and

ANNEX

1. BREAKING NEWS

Gen. Atem Marol Biar who was appointed yesterday through Presidential decree as Inspector General of South Sudan National Police Service has been in a land-grabbing battle fighting the vulnerable and powerless widow who has been occupant of the land for more than 37 years since 1986.

Yesterday at around 3 PM without following the rightful legal procedure of land ownership, he started ramming down the building. It was raining and the children were beaten, chased out by the hungry hired police goons. Now that he has powers to kill and loot, the life of the poor widow shall be in absolute danger unless she surrenders ownership of the land.

Gen. Atem Marol started claiming the land in 2018. After he was appointed the DG of DCRNPI, he bribed the Central Equatoria Ministry of Land and Housing and the court specifically the people who are presiding over the case. He doesn't have the original document of the land; sometimes he swerved the court hearing on the pretext of a busy schedule.

Surprisingly this morning, the chief of the area Sultan Michael Loku Legge who has been siding with the widow was arrested and taken to unknown destination.

The land being battled is in Thongping along the American residence road, down to the Turkey embassy (sources: unknown).

2. What are The Difference between Local, State, and Federal Law Enforcement?

Primarily, the difference between local, state, and federal law enforcement officials is who they work for and their jurisdiction. For instance, state-level officials work for a state agency and enforce state laws, but have no jurisdiction in federal matters; local sheriffs or police officers work for municipalities and enforce local and state laws within that municipality, but generally have no jurisdiction outside of that area.

 

Local law enforcement agencies, such as municipal, county, tribal, and regional police forces, derive authority from the local governing body. Their primary objective is to uphold and enforce the laws within their jurisdiction. These agencies play a crucial role in providing patrol services and conducting investigations to address local crimes effectively.

 

Municipal law enforcement

 

In towns and cities, police officers will patrol streets by car or highway, provides traffic assistance, and respond to emergencies and calls for help, and maintain peace and security. If a crime occurs, they may investigate, interview people, and apprehend suspects. They also testify in court. Police detectives concentrate on investigations, while crime scene investigators are charged with gathering and analyzing evidence.

 

Some municipal police also provide protection for parks, public transportation, and local rivers and lakes, but in larger cities, these duties are often performed by specialized police units. Some sworn officers are employed as private police for schools, universities, or hospitals.

County Law Enforcement

 

All but three states (Alaska, Hawaii, and Connecticut) have law enforcement that work on the county level, but their jurisdictions and duties vary widely. They may perform full police functions, including investigations, in rural areas outside of towns and cities. Or, they may patrol county roads and assist in traffic control, serve summons and eviction notices, transport prisoners, or provide security at county courthouses or corrections facilities.

A handful of states have constables. They may be elected officials with limited duties, or employed as full-duty officers. 

State Law Enforcement

 

Specific duties of state-level law enforcement officials differ from state to state. All states have officers that enforce traffic laws and keep roadways safe. These are usually called troopers or highway patrol officers. However, in some states, there is a difference between a state police officer and a highway patrolman. For example, in California, the job of policing highways and roads falls to the California Highway Patrol. Investigating statewide crimes is the job of the California Bureau of Investigation. In other states, the state police department will provide services for both highway patrol and crime investigation.

 

Fish and game wardens or conservation officers are also generally employed on the state level. They monitor the safe and legal usage of public parks, waterways, forests, and open areas. They may enforce hunting and fishing laws, investigate crimes, and respond to emergencies.

Federal Law Enforcement

Federal law enforcement agents serve in many capacities, from providing security for federal buildings and elected officials to investigating federal crimes and responding to terrorist attacks.

Cyber Officers

 

Cyber policing is a fast-growing field of law enforcement. It operates mainly on the federal level, but local and state police do use digital technology to some extent.

“Cybercrime is under reported,” says Markovic. “If somebody hacks your computer, you don’t usually call the police.”

 

However, if the crime takes place on a major scale, such as data breach or ransomware attack, cyber police get involved, Markovic says. On the local and state levels, specialized police officers do use computer technology to detect and investigate crimes and suspects.

Becoming a cyber specialist or forensic computer analyst requires knowledge of technology and a college degree. Like any job in law enforcement, you will be required to attend a police training facility and undergo a background check.

 

Forensic computer specialists are also employed by private firms, Markovic states. 

Peace Officer

 

In most cases, the term “peace officer” is used interchangeably with “police officer,” since police consider their main objective to be keeping the peace. This can be confusing because in a few places across the country, “peace officer” refers to an officer who has limited duties. Some states refer to this role as auxiliary or reserve officer. Non-sworn peace officers may be employed, appointed, or elected.

Some assignments of designated peace officers differ greatly but may include:

·         Security duties

·         Traffic and crowd control

·         Working in correctional facilities

·         Assisting with search and rescue operations, and

·         Assisting police officers with designated duties

Sources: All Criminal Justice Schools

About the author

© Hüstin Läkü, Sr., is a native South Sudanese who was educated in South Sudan, Sudan, Egypt, Germany, and Switzerland. Läkü, Sr., is a graduate of Institute of Federalism, University of Fribourg in Switzerland

His current research topic is Evaluating South Sudan Governance: From the Perspective of Federated Forms and Devolution; South Sudan Governance: A Call for Federalism to Address, Marginalization and Prevent Armed Conflict Recurrence; South Sudan: Institutionalized Discrimination in Organized Forces and Public Services (Part 2); Administrative Corruption, Nepotism, Injustice, and Discrimination in South Sudan (Part 1); The Tribal Police Force in South Sudan; SPLA Versus Khartoum Regimes: Animal Farm Carbon Copies; and the Politics of Foreign Aid-The Myth of International Aid in Africa. Deep-rooted conflict, community mediation, facilitation, and leadership training are areas of interest in my research. Furthermore, Hüstin has given lectures on Sudanese topics in the United States, Canadian universities, the Canadian Military Academy in Kingston, Rome, Berlin, Innsbruck, Geneva, and Slovenia. Hüstin is the recipient of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr's life time Dream keeper.