NO. |
RANK/NAME
|
POSITION |
STATE
|
GENDER
|
ETHNICITY |
PARTY |
QUALIFICATIONS |
1. |
LGen. Santino Deng Wol |
Chief of Defense Forces |
NBG/ Aweil |
Male |
Dinka |
IG |
Secondary school certificate from
Sudan. Trained SPLA cadre. Attended
several military trainings in East Africa, Zimbabwe & Ethiopia. |
2. |
LGen. Gabriel Duop Lam |
Deputy Chief of Defense Forces |
Jonglei |
Male |
Lou Nuer |
IO |
Data N/A |
3. |
LGen. Koang Gatkuoth Kerjok |
Inspector General |
Jonglei |
Male |
Lou Nuer |
IO |
Data N/A |
4. |
LGen. Thoy Chany Reat |
Assistant CDF for Operations |
US |
Male |
Nuer/ Ayod |
IG |
Data N/A |
5. |
LGen Peter Dor |
Malakal Sector COMD |
Lakes |
Male |
Nuer |
SSOA |
Data N/A |
6. |
LGen. James Koang Chuol |
Assistant CDF for Training and
Research |
US |
Male |
Nuer Nasir |
IG |
Data N/A |
7. |
LGen Stephen Marshal Babanen |
Chief of Military Intelligence |
Pibor
|
Male |
Morle |
IG |
Data N/A |
8. |
LGen. Malual Majok |
Assistant CDF for Admin & Finance |
Jonglei/ Bor |
Male |
Dinka |
IG |
Data N/A |
9. |
LGen. Ernest Dut Wol |
Director for Procurement |
Warrap |
Male |
Dinka |
IG |
Data N/A |
10. |
LGen. Al-Tayib Gatluak |
Director for Military Production |
US |
Male |
Nuer/ Mayoum
Bantiu |
IO |
Data N/A |
11. |
LGen Thiik Achiek |
Commander of Ground Forces |
Warrap |
Male |
Dinka |
IG |
Data N/A |
12. |
LGen. Rabi Majung Emmanuel |
Airforce Comd |
CE |
Male |
Yangwara |
IG |
Gen. Mujung is a graduate of
School of Sciences Management with emphasis in Business, University of Juba,
South Sudan; Sudanese Military Academy; the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
(RMAS) in London, U.K. Gen. Mujung was a classmate and roommate of King Abdullah
II of Jordan. He holds Certificates and Diplomas in Standard Military
Course (SMC), and Regular Career Course (RCC) and Certificate in
senior military Command and Leadership from the US-African Strategic
Research Centre. Gen. Mujung is well-respected senior military officer who
commanded several fronts during the war liberation and by far is
the most qualified, experienced and skillful SPLA officer, but as a non-Dinka
he was deprived of promotions and benefits such as vehicle and others for
over 10 years, even though he is an SPLA officer fought in Southern and
Eastern Sudan bushes, while illiterate Paul Malong without formal education
and military training was promoted to Lt. General and Chief of Staff of SPLA
to preside over qualified, competent, experienced, skillful and senior non
Dinka Officers (The 2005-2017 SPLA Promotions List). |
13. |
LGen. Wesley Welebe Samson |
Assistant CDF for Logistics |
WE |
Male |
Moru/ Amadi |
IO |
Data N/A |
14. |
LGen. Ashab Khamis Fahal |
Assistant CDF for Moral Orientation |
WBG |
Male |
Balanda/ Fertit |
IO |
Data N/A |
15. |
LGen. Garang Ayii Akol |
Commander for Riverine units |
NBG |
Male |
Dinka |
SSOA |
Brother of VP Abdel Bagi Ayii. |
*IO In
Opposition
STATE |
CE |
EE |
WE |
JONGLEI |
US |
UN |
LAKES |
WARRAP |
WBG |
NBG |
PIBOR |
No of Officers |
1 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
Percentage % |
7% |
0% |
7% |
20% |
20% |
0% |
0% |
13.3% |
7% |
20% |
7% |
BY
GENDER (2022)
ITEM |
FEMALE |
MALE |
REMARKS |
No of Officers |
0 |
15 |
Defeats CPA 25% quotas for women |
Percentage % |
0% |
100% |
N/A |
*CPA The Comprehensive Peace Agreement
BY
PARTY (2022)
ITEM |
IG |
IO |
SSOA |
KITGWANG |
REMARKS |
No of Officers |
8 |
5 |
2 |
0 |
N/A |
Percentage % |
53.3% |
33.3% |
13.3% |
0% |
N/A |
BY
ETHNICITY (2022)
No. |
Ethnic
Group |
No
of Officers |
Percentage
% |
No. |
Ethnic
Group |
No
of Officers |
Percentage
% |
1. |
Acholi |
0 |
0% |
33. |
Angakuel |
0 |
0% |
2. |
Avukaya |
0 |
0% |
34. |
Bai |
0 |
0% |
3. |
Baka |
0 |
0% |
35. |
Balanda |
1 |
2% |
4. |
Bari |
0 |
0% |
36. |
Banda |
0 |
0% |
5. |
Didinga |
0 |
0% |
37. |
Bongo |
0 |
0% |
6. |
Dongatona |
0 |
0% |
38. |
Burun |
0 |
0% |
7. |
Horiok |
0 |
0% |
39. |
Dar Fertit |
0 |
0% |
8. |
Imatong |
0 |
0% |
40. |
Dinka |
5 |
8% |
9. |
Jiye |
0 |
0% |
41. |
Cello |
0 |
0% |
10. |
Kakwa |
0 |
0% |
42. |
Jumjum |
0 |
0% |
11. |
Keliku |
0 |
0% |
43. |
Jur Beli |
0 |
0% |
12. |
Kuku |
0 |
0% |
44. |
Kaligi |
0 |
0% |
13. |
Lango |
0 |
0% |
45. |
Kara |
0 |
0% |
14. |
Larim (Baya) |
0 |
0% |
46. |
Kichepo |
0 |
0% |
15. |
Lokoya |
0 |
0% |
47. |
Luwo |
0 |
0% |
16. |
Lolubo |
0 |
0% |
48. |
Mangayat |
0 |
0% |
17. |
Lopit |
0 |
0% |
49. |
Murle |
1 |
2% |
18. |
Lugbwara |
0 |
0% |
50. |
Ndogo |
0 |
0% |
19. |
Ma’adi |
0 |
0% |
51. |
Nuer |
6 |
9.0% |
20. |
Makaraka |
0 |
0% |
52. |
Sere |
0 |
0% |
21. |
Moru |
1 |
2% |
53. |
Yulu |
0 |
0% |
22. |
Mundari |
0 |
0% |
54. |
Anyuak |
0 |
0% |
23. |
Mundu |
0 |
0% |
55. |
Data
N/A |
0 |
0% |
24. |
Ndogo |
0 |
0% |
56. |
Data
N/A |
0 |
0% |
25. |
Nyangwara |
1 |
2% |
57. |
Data
N/A |
0 |
0% |
26. |
Nyangatom |
0 |
0% |
58. |
Data
N/A |
0 |
0% |
27. |
Otuho (Lotuho) |
0 |
0% |
59. |
Data
N/A |
0 |
0% |
28. |
Päri |
|
|
60. |
Data
N/A |
0 |
0% |
29 |
Pöjulu |
0 |
0% |
61. |
Data
N/A |
0 |
0% |
30 |
Tenet |
0 |
0% |
62. |
Data
N/A |
0 |
0% |
31. |
Toposa |
0 |
0% |
63. |
Data
N/A |
0 |
0% |
32 |
Zande/Azande |
0 |
0% |
64. |
Data
N/A |
0 |
0% |
|
|
|
|
65. |
Data
N/A |
0 |
0% |
|
|
|
|
66. |
Data
N/A |
0 |
0% |
THE LIST IS INCOMPLETE
ANALYSIS
DATA DON’T LIE
NO DATA, NO PROBLEM,
AND NO SOLUTION
Data shows that the
fake, sham, and containment implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement of
2018 is mainly about securing political, military, and security positions for individuals
belonging to Dinka and Nuer ethnicities. The 2015
Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS), Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA) and the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict
in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), implementation is for Riak to
regain his lost powers and Kiir to reconsolidate more powers and ascertain
Dinka domination.
In addition to the fact
that the R-ARCSS peace implementation is all about dividing security, economic
and political positions between Dinka and Nuer ethnicities it has confirmed the
ill intention of some Dinka and Nuer ethnicities individuals behaving as if
South Sudan belong to them before everyone else and the R-ARCSS peace implementation
produced losers.
The Upper Nile losers
of the Dinka-Nuer R-ARCSS peace implementation is Kitgwang group which was not mentioned
in the R-ARCSS peace agreement, but if Kiir is really for genuine peace he
could have rewarded Kitgwang with some positions from his 60% share, but greed prevented
him from to accommodating them in the R-ARCSS peace implementation.
The Greater Equatoria losers are Maj. Gen. Joseph Yata Erasto, who defected from IO
to IG. Gen. Erasto could have been given a position if he had remained in the IO
with Dr Riak. Hon. Henry Odwar who lost his Ministerial and MP portfolios and
most importantly sacrificed his life for IO under Dr. Machar and Kitgwang under
Gen. Simon
Gatwech and brought his political struggle and career to an end. Finally, the
big losers are the Equatorians who fed and carried Riak and Angelina on their shoulders to
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and helped them airlifted to Khartoum for
safety and treatment. In addition to above losers are Equatorians who hosted IO
in Kuku and other parts of Greater Equatoria lands. The lessons learned for
Equatorians is Angelina & Riek have taken Equatorians for granted with rid
and for how long can Equatorians be use as ladder? Can Equatorian learn from their
past mistakes or still wanna follow others without thinking.
In nutshell, the R-ARCSS
peace agreement is a bad Dinka-Nuer peace agreement and its implementation,
because it rewarded the very elements that created the conflicts in the first
place. Data shows that Kiir is only interested to use his position to benefit
his tribesmen and so is Dr. Machar and the rest of the country can go to hell. The
majority of 64 ethnicity groups are not represented in any of Kiir’s
appointments, promotions and deployments-whether it is diplomatic, military,
police, Prison, SSN, Wildlife, Custom, ministerial and parliamentary
portfolios.
Finally, the
non-signatories’ parties of South Sudan peace agreement were on the right side
of history and prove that the R-ARCSS peace agreement failed to address the
root causes of the conflicts in the country. Also, the current R-ARCSS peace
agreement implementation reinforces bad governance, insecurity, food security,
marginalization, discrimination, nepotism, favoritism, and corruption with
impunity in the country, and the conflict continues. Over more, the R-ARCSS
peace agreement implementation puts South Sudan for sale to Egypt to build
Jonglei Canal, even though Egyptian government was opposed to South Sudan independence
and blocked all discussions on Southern Sudan cause globally; Chinese to
continue stealing oil; and Sri Lanka to take over Equatorian lands grabbed.