The Politics and Practices of the Common Enemy of the South Sudan

The situation of "a common enemy" for the people of the Equatoria state in South Sudan reminds me of a story I first read in the book Politics of Self-Reliance in Africa. The story is titled "the Gentleman of the Jungle". You may already know the story very well. I will, however, briefly recite it for the benefit of those who have not heard it before or just to refresh your memory:

According to this story, the Gentleman of the Jungle is the lion. One day a man is seated, relaxing inside his house. The lion says to the man "it is so cold outside here, can I just let my head in the house." Of course, the man allows first, the lion's head into the house, followed by the shoulder, and then front legs. When the lion completely inside, it says to the man "there is not enough room for you and me in the house, get out!" The man who owns the house is thrown out and the lion takes over the house. This story is interesting because it is the lion who now determines the fate of the house once inside rather than the man who built.

The story of the man and the lion is exactly what is happening to the indigenous people of the Equatoria state of south Sudan. During the war the regime of Khartoum soldiers forced the Southern Sudanese to vacate their lands and flee into other regions, urban centres or to the neighbouring countries as refugees as well as internal displaced persons (IDP). As the war was initially dominated by the Dinka, they were the first to be displaced from their regions, and they moved south to the Equatoria state, displacing the Equatorians who were forced to flee to the urban centres or to the neighbouring countries.

In the process of settling the villages vacated, both the Arabs renamed equatorial's cities they occupied and the Dinka's also renamed these places using their own names.

The problem with this issue is that it may become very divisive for southern Sudanese. Instead of a "common enemy" for the southern Sudan, the Dinka and the Khartoum regime have become the common enemy for the Equatorians. It is obvious that the Dinka renamed the villages using their own names because they felt these reminded them of their old villages they left behind. This is not difficult to comprehend since the feeling of "home" is very important as the homestead is a person's base. Unfortunately, what the Dinka and those who are following the Khartoum regime are doing is that they are not only alienating the Equatorians from their total environment, but also sowing seeds of discord among the people of south Sudan. For example, Juba is the base, and homestead for Equatorians, and their way of life. Now, they are being forced out of this city where they have attachment for economic, political, cultural, and religious reasons for ages.

The Khartoum regime did not bring armies from north of Sudan, but recruited the soldiers from the local population as a result of the divisions that exist among the Southern Sudanese. The Khartoum regime has helped set community against community, state against state, and clan against clan. Instead of uniting and focusing on one common southern Sudan enemy, the Dinka have helped empower the Khartoum regime over all the spheres of the local community. In other words, the Khartoum regime is now using Southerners to oppress themselves.

In my view, one of the most serious results of Khartoum regime and its followers within SPLA/M was to alienate Equatorians from political power and their cultural environments. You can see that all the ministers, ambassadors and high ranking officials of the government of South Sudan (GOSS) are mainly from one tribe or one state, in other word there is no equal representation of all the Southerners in the GOSS.

To alienate Equatorians from their political and cultural way is to deprive them from their power base. Alienation from one's environment brings the disease that be could call "not knowing oneself"

In my view as Equatorians, we should not hide our heads in the sand like an ostrich and pretend that there is no problem or that we can solve the problems of the 150,000 Dinkas in Yei by importing other tribes from their base, and homestead, and settle them in Equatorial State (Yei city). We should address this problem head-on. It was the Equatorians who fought back one year ago when Dr. John Garang was killed in a plane crash. The whole world witnessed the burning of northerners' shops in Juba, but not in Malakal, and Wau. Equatorians should think twice why Juba is to be the capital of the South Sudan government or otherwise Equatorians will become victims of CPA? Also, the lack of leadership in Equatorial is number one problem in Equatorial State; some one must stand up against and make the injustice visible.

By Justin Laku ©

Will the Peace Hold in Southern Sudan after the passing of Dr. John Garang?

The roots of the conflict in the Sudan goes back to the early 19th century, several decades before the advent of the Western colonialism in the Sudan; which makes it one the longest wars in the world after the Israeli- Palestine war.
Also, the war in the Southern Sudan, between the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the National Islamic fundamentalism (NIF) in Khartoum is among Africa’s oldest and deadliest conflicts and largest in the region. More then 3 million were killed, achieving a death toll over twenty times higher than Darfur’s do date.
The NIF viewed the CPA as an opportunity to direct the international community’s attention away from their ongoing genocide in Darfur. While they have made some cosmetic changes, the NIF hasn’t fulfilled their core obligations to the CPA and don’t appear any more committed to this peace agreement than to any of the other treaties they’ve signed. In fact the NIF has put enormous obstacles in place to prevent progress on the CPA. It seems clear the NIF has no intention of sharing either power or oil revenue with the SPLA.
On the one hand it is impossible for the SPLA or the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGDA) to know if the NIF is sharing oil revenues according to the dictates of the CPA because the NIF won’t disclose what the total revenues are. It is also likely that the NIF will use oil money to manipulate voting in the upcoming referendum on separation, which will take place in six years time.
The NIF’s continued support for the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda is another problem calling the success of the CPA into question. How could the LRA cross the east side of the river to west, without the logistical support of the NIF? Yei is the only source of food to the population in Juba and most of the Arab trades are not happy that food should come from Yei, because it will have negative impact on their business in Juba.
As know you the recent attacked on the convey in early September between Juba and Yei, the NIF is behind it. How could (LRA) cross the east side of the river to west, without the logistic support of the NIF? Yei is the only source of food to Juba population and most of the Arab trades are not happy that the food should come from Yei, because it will have negative impact on their business in Juba.
The United Nation Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), could have prevented the recent attack in Yei-Juba road, but the 700 UNMIS peacekeeping troops are based only in Juba unarmed and mostly allied with Khartoum’s regimes and who have large investments in the Sudanese oil sector. Most of the UNMIS peacekeeping troops from Australia, Russia and other European countries are enjoying themselves in Khartoum’s expensive hotels playing cards and smoking cigars instead of patrolling the North / South border.
Besides this, the mandate of United Nation Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) is very weak. They have no power to arrest treaty violators, detain suspects or fight back. This is a repeat of the situation in Darfur and if such attacks continue UNMIS will be as impotent as the AU in that region.
Furthermore, the NIF has not disclosed the number of troops it still has in Southern Sudan to the UNMIS, either in Juba or other part of Southern Sudan.
Added to this hostile elements are the 500,000 Janjaweed with their horses, women and children that the NIF relocated from Darfur to Rokon County, about 60 miles south west of Juba. Their presence tends to indicate that the NIF intends to unleash a campaign of atrocities on Rokon County similar to the one they have in Darfur.
Another tactic the NIF is using to destabilize South Sudan is the transfer of large numbers of Egyptian Arabs to that region. This is in keeping with their policy of Arabizing Sudan and the implementation of this policy is what leads to the violence in Darfur.
The NIF encourages immigration from Egypt by offering these migrants the following rights: freedom of entry to Sudan without visas; residence permits are provided free of cost; freedom of movement within the whole of Sudan; the ability to own land upon arrival; the right to vote as soon as they settle in Sudan.
All of this is going on while tens of thousands of Sudanese languish in Egypt in deplorable conditions with none of the aforementioned privileges. Nineteen thousand are registered with the UNHCR, but there are many more Sudanese stranded in Egypt, unable to return to Sudan.
The strategy is obvious; the Arabs are being relocated in the south while African Southerners are being kept from returning in an attempt to shift the demographic to favour Khartoum when the vote for independence comes in 2011.
The abuse of South Sudanese is not restricted to Egypt. There are countless Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) living in Khartoum or in the IDP camps around it such as Hagi Yousif , Kalakata and Al-Sal’ama Camp in Jebel.
Since the death of Garang the dumping of five to ten bodies of South Sudanese has become a daily occurrence. Those who had managed to scrape together enough to escape the IDP camps and eke out a living in Khartoum are being driven from their homes once again by landlords who are increasing rents by as much as 100%. Whole families are being driven back into the camps straining what resources are available there.
In another effort to keep Southerners from returning home the NIF has increased air fare from Khartoum to Juba from $100, to $200.
These are just a few of the tactics implemented by the NIF to insure the CPA fails. It is up to the international community to monitor these violations and, more importantly, insure there are very real and very negative consequences for such abuse. Only through this type of foreign intervention will the NIF be made to respect their obligations under the CPA and implement it fully without delay.

By Justin Laku©

An open letter to all Members of Parliament: Fostering Peace in Sudan

The Friends of Sudan (Canada)



19th September 2010

An open letter to all Members of Parliament: Fostering Peace in Sudan


Dear _________________:


With Sudan’s general elections now over, the time has come to refocus on the challenges that lie ahead for Sudan in the next year. The tremendous task of holding elections as agreed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement drew international attention to the technical shortcomings of that process. It is likely that in the coming months attention will be concentrated once more on the technical aspects of the second major component of the peace agreement: the January 2011 referendum concerning the independence of Southern Sudan.

We are asking you and all your colleagues in the House of Commons to speak clearly and without political partisanship in support of this referendum process, which will be held on January 9th, 2011. Evidence from a wide variety of respected sources point to problems with the voting process: hundreds of thousands Canadians of Sudanese origin will not be able to exercise their right to vote in the referendum; another 6 million Southern Sudanese have been displaced and are still living as refugees in the northern states of Sudan and will not be able to reach polling stations; at least 35,000 of these refugees have been forced to slavery, and 4000 South Sudanese women in prisons in Khartoum and Umdurman. The world, including Canada, remains largely unaware and mostly silent. Even the UN speaks with a strangely attenuated voice, willing to sacrifice justice so long as a form of peace persists.

In Sudan the tragedy of the Western Sahara is being replayed and a failure to speak and act would be shameful. We ask you to insist that the Prime Minister raise this urgent referendum question with the President of the United States and the United Nation Secretary General. Specifically we recommend that the Prime Minister urge in the strongest possible terms that internally displaced (IDPs) Southern Sudanese living in the north be repatriated with the assistance of the UNHCR and other agencies, and that the Sudan Referendum Commission recognize the voting rights of the Sudanese refugee Diaspora dual citizenships living in Canada and the U.S. by opening Outside Country Vote Centers (OCVCs) in major cities.

To ensure impartiality, the OCVCs should be under the supervision of an independent body such the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), or Elections Canada, rather than the Sudan Embassy or the Government of South Sudan Mission Office in North America. Canada could support the OCVCs with knowledgeable experts, independent scrutineers and other resources. By taking the lead and acting swiftly, Canada may motivate members of the U.N. Security Council (especially France and the United Kingdom) into introducing a resolution to address the importance of the outside country vote in the Sudanese referenda.

There is much more to be done to ensure the continuance of peace in Sudan, but given the urgency of the referenda situation we believe that common action by MPs would be an excellent first step. Therefore, there is urgency for special envoy to represent Canada’s interest in Sudan in referenda. We look forward to hearing your voice in the House on this subject.






Justin Laku
Director


Cc: The United Nations Secretary General
Cc: President of the United States of America
Cc: President of Government of South Sudan
Cc: Chairman of the African Union
Cc: The European Union
Cc: The Diplomatic Missions in Ottawa
Cc: The U.S. Special envoy to Sudan
Cc: The U.S Ambassador to the United Nations
Cc: Sudan Ambassador to the United States

An Open Letter to each and every Member of Parliament in Canada:

An Open Letter to each and every Member of Parliament:

Dear _________________;

We are asking you and all your colleagues in the House of Commons to speak urgently and effectively, and without political partisanship, for the people of Western Sudan. Based on incontrovertible evidence, hundreds of people are today being murdered in Darfur in Western Sudan; over 750,000 have been displaced, and at least 100,000 have been forced to flee to neighbouring Chad. The world, including Canada, remains largely unaware and mostly silent. Even the UN speaks with a strangely attenuated voice.

In Darfur the tragedy of Rwanda is being replayed and a failure to speak and act would be shameful. We ask you to insist that the Prime Minister raise this urgent humanitarian question with the President of the United States. Specifically we recommend that the Prime Minister urge in the strongest possible terms that the United States immediately bring to the UN Security Council a resolution which would place a substantial and effective number of number of unarmed international observers on the ground in areas of conflict in Darfur. Canada would support this with funds and people. Such a resolution should also call for immediate access to all areas of Darfur by UN and international humanitarian agencies to attend to the food, water and security needs of the thousands of refugees and wounded. Failure by the United States to agree to introduce such a resolution should not deter Canada from pressing other members of the Security Council, particularly France and Britain, from introducing a resolution.

The above is the least that Canada can do in this horrifying crisis. There is much more to be done, but given the urgency of the situation we think that a common action from Members, before the house rises, would be an appropriate beginning.

We look forward to your action.


Signed
Members of the Canadian Friends of Sudan.©

encl.
April 23, 2004 Amnesty International Public Statement
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGIOR410282004
April 23, 2004 Human Rights Watch (HRW)
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/04/23/sudan8487.htm
April 14, 2004 Human Rights Watch (HRW)
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/04/14/sudan8431.htm
For detailed analysis and background (not enclosed) see HRW
http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0404/

Preparations for Peace in Southern Sudan Our Position

Preparations for Peace in Southern Sudan
Our Position

That Canada take steps, including funding of capacity building initiatives, NOW, to enhance the southern Sudan infrastructure and institutional capacity in preparation for peace and the massive return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees to southern Sudan following the signing of a peace accord between the SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan. Further, that Canada pressure the Government of Sudan to desist from actions that are detrimental to a stable and permanent peace.

Issues

Current infrastructure, both physical and institutional in southern Sudan does not have the capacity to accept large numbers of returnees or to effectively use large flows of funds. Canada must act now to develop capacity in southern Sudanese institutions to absorb larger funding flows than have been available in the past.

The Government of Sudan seems to be using the crisis in Darfur to delay the peace process in southern Sudan while encouraging activities that are detrimental to a lasting peace. Canada must work to apply international pressure to ensure such activity ceases and the negotiations are brought to a successful conclusion.

Background

The Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement have signed a cease-fire and expect to sign a permanent peace accord following the principles outlined in the Machakos Agreement within the next few months. The government, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and relief agencies need to expedite preparations for the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and thousands of refugees to their homes in southern Sudan once a peace agreement is signed.

Over 1 million IDPs and thousands of refugees are expected in the first six months, which could lead to southern Sudan being overwhelmed. Donors must immediately begin to fund programmes to assist returnees, rather than wait for a final peace deal. These include local, food aid, health care, education and mine action institutions. Most of these will be NGOs as the government of southern Sudan does not yet exist. USAID's Famine Early Warning System warns that current food insecurity in "high alert" areas such as Aweil, Wau, Magwit, Torit, Bor, Juba and Yei would also be a problem for both returnees and host populations.

The peace process in Kenya has come to a halt as the government delays and delays while attempting to mollify the international community by extending the ceasefire in 3 month increments. The government also appears to be encouraging actions that are detrimental to a lasting peace, in particular, allocating depopulated lands to new settlers from the north among them some Egyptians. The Egyptian settlers are apparently being allocated land under an agreement between Sudan and Egypt allowing freedom of movement, residence and work between the two countries.
©CFS,2004.

Action Brief – Disarming and Disbanding the Janjaweed Militias

Action Brief – Disarming and Disbanding the Janjaweed Militias
Our Urgent Recommendation to the Government of Canada

That Canada use its influence at the United Nations and elsewhere to pressure the Government of Sudan to take substantial and real action to disarm and disband the Janjaweed militias in Darfur.
Issues

The Janjaweed militias, supported by the Government of Sudan, are the principal perpetrators of the genocide in Darfur. They must be disarmed and disbanded if the refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are to return to their home villages. 

 
Background

The humanitarian situation in Southern Darfur State is now worse than it has ever been. The current trend continues as bands of Janjaweed descend on the south from Northern and Western Darfur states, moving towards the Nyala and Sharaya areas. In spite of the deployment of the African Union Force and the increased presence of aid agencies these attacks continue. Neither the UN nor other agencies have managed to clearly map the areas depopulated as a result of militia activity, but according to humanitarian agencies, a clear trend has emerged of non-Arabs being hounded out of rural areas into urban centres. The current estimates are 1.2 million displaced and 70,000 killed. This is a clear case of ethnic cleansing and genocide, and it must be stopped.

The Janjaweed have attacked black Africans from the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups with a ruthlessness that has not been seen in the region for some time, report aid agencies and refugees. They have killed, raped, maimed, looted and burned down tens of thousands of village homes, displacing hundreds of thousands of people. 

Many of the attacks take on a similar pattern, eyewitnesses report. Hundreds or thousands of Janjaweed riding horses and camels arrive in an area from different directions before engaging in a major offensive. Rich from looting thousands of head of cattle, they are well armed with automatic weapons and carry modern communications equipment. They easily coordinate their attacks with government forces. Before and after burning the non-Arab villages collectively accused of harbouring rebels, they often loiter, armed with automatic rifles, around water sources. Eyewitnesses say they intimidate and rape local women, loot their animals and destroy key infrastructure.

Given the nature of the crisis it will not be possible for the refugees and IDPs to return home until the Janjaweed are disarmed and disbanded.

©CFS
2004

Action Brief – African Union Mission in Sudan

Action Brief – African Union Mission in Sudan
Our Urgent Recommendation to the Government of Canada
That Canada strengthens its contribution to the African Union Mission in Sudan by providing increased and urgently needed funding and technical assistance for logistics and communications.
Issue
The African Union Mission is Sudan is very small for such a large and isolated area. It will need extensive logistics and communications support if it is to fulfill its mandate. Also, based on experience in the field, it may need to be increased in size again.
Background
On 8 April 2004 the Government of Sudan and the two rebel groups, Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM) and the Sudan Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) signed a Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. The agreement provided for a complete cessation of all military activity, unrestricted humanitarian access to IDPs and refugees, neutralization of the armed militias by the Government of Sudan, the concentration armed rebel groups in identified areas and the formation of a Ceasefire Commission and appropriate monitoring force.

On 28 May 2004 the parties signed the Agreement on the Modalities for the establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in Darfur. The first AU observers were to be deployed to Darfur by 2 June 2004. On 28 October 2004 the AU agreed to augment the original AMIS monitoring force from approximately 300 personnel to 3320 personnel including 2341 military, among them 450 observers, up to 815 civilian police and appropriate civilian personnel. These additional deployments commenced on 28 October and will continue over the next few months.

Under the original plan much of the logistics infrastructure and on-site facilities were to be provided by the Government of Sudan. This new and much larger force will require substantial additional logistics that are unlikely to be available from the Government of Sudan.

Canada has experience in providing logistics and communications for a long distance force. A commitment to provide technical advisers and communications detachments would demonstrate Canada’s resolve to support this mission.

©CFS
2004