Sudan Elections: The Test of Democracy

In January 2005, the government of Omar Hassan Al Bashir and the Sudan People Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A) signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).Under the CPA provision of “one country, and two systems” model, the north and south will share power, resources and wealth which are located in the disputed areas of Abyei, Blue Nile State and the Nuba Mountains.

These disputed areas are still officially part of the North but may have an opportunity to join the South pursuant to a public vote under the CPA provisions. In addition, as per the CPA, both the north and south will maintain separate armies in addition to a joint integrated army that they share. Following a six year transitional period, the south will determine whether it wants to secede via a referendum or remain part of a united Sudan.

Sudan like other African States is facing a democratic test through transformation from a one party state to a multi-party rule via good governance and its key components of fair, free, transparency, credible, inclusive, legitimacy, accountability, and rule of law. However, the main issues of disputes are the census, free press, the Election Commission, Security law, and ballot papers.

The census is a periodic count of the population and the results are use to define electoral constituencies, affecting the number of parliamentary seats as well as state budget for each Sudanese state. The 2009, census in Sudan reduced the South Sudan population, while increasing the population of war-torn Darfur which resulted in the IDPs displacement, 400,000 died, and loss of life as a result of hunger and drought. Reliable source from the GoSS suggested that the SPLM and NCP agreed that 60 more seats will be created in the national parliament in order to compensate the census results as well as will give SPLM veto power in the national parliament.

SPLM could have organized a census of the South Sudan population and contrasted its results with 2009 census to demonstrate its position credibly, as well as to provide the international community and donors and trustees in particular with substantial evidence about the census. It has not done so.

The free press is compromised by the politics of the state parties in the North and South. Since the CPA, neither the South nor the North state parties have been able to transform themselves towards democratic behaviour with respect to other parties. The SPLM restricts other political parties from campaigning in the South. South Sudan TV under the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) is not mandated to cover non-SPLM political rallies. For instance, in the first week of March 2010, the SPLM-DC was obstructed in Wau by GoSS security officials not to hold rallies. Further, in a letter dated November 9, 2009, “Salva Kirr, the first vice president of Sudan gave a directive through Dr. Luka Tombekana Monja, Minister of Cabinet Affairs, to all the governors of ten South Sudan States to cooperate and not to hinder works of other political parties except the so called SPLM-DC.” Such orders and directives go against the rules of the National Election Commission (NEC).

Most of the northern political parties including SPLM accused NEC of being biased in favour of NCP and suggested that the election be postponed. President Al Bashir warned that there would be no referendum without primary elections in April 2010.

The opposition and SPLM parties were not ready for election, were disorganized and badly financed. Furthermore, SPLM was afraid of losing seats hence lose control of the South Sudan Parliament since there are a large number of independent candidates within SPLM who are nominated by their constituencies and the road for referendum would be difficult. For the NCP, the only way to weaken the SPLM and to break the horns of separatists in the South was through the election. Since SPLM failed to deliver on services and real development since it assumed power in 2005, it was not ready, and it is also inexperienced in the politics of election.

The NCP in Khartoum has delivered many development projects such as building new roads that connect the North, East, and West. Currently the NCP has proposed a new highway that will connect Port Sudan and Senegal through Chad; Sudan and South Africa; schools, universities, hospitals, bridges, airports; electricity and water network; and initiated new agricultural projects in Geizra agricultural Scheme.

To contrast NCP’s achievements with SPLM’s, there are no new schools, hospitals, roads, bridges, airports and electricity and water networks that connect the South’s major cities, the water services and electricity network are still very poor; and there is no agricultural scheme initiated to meet the food demands of South Sudanese. Most basic necessities are imported from Uganda, Kenya, andNorth Sudan. Furthermore, the SPLM is invisible in the North, East, and Western Sudan. The Chairman of SPLM did not visit many cities and states in the North except GoSS Speaker of the parliament. SPLM failed to initiate projects in the North, East, and Darfur. South Sudan is very poor. During heated discussions, SPLM tended to walk out of the parliament sessions.

Based on the above factors, early exit and withdrawal of Yasir Arman was the best solution to avoid disappointment and shame, because the election was about service delivery and real development on the ground. SPLM's new strategy was to consolidate its power, present in the South and hope to win the referendum at all cost, and tried to buy time to avoid the April 2010 election.

If South Sudan under the SPLM achieved referendum, the small tribes will be under the major tribes which control SPLM/A currently and South Sudan will be faced with the issue of majority versus minority as in the Balkans in Eastern Europe.

"We're trying to separate ourselves from the Arabs because of marginalization,” says Clement Maring Samuel, a Mundari SPLA pastor now serving as Terekeka's Commissioner. "But if the Dinka don't behave well, we will separate again."(additional reporting by Chen Aizhu in Beijing and Andrew Quinn in Washington; editing by Sara Ledwith).On the other hand, if the referendum failed, South Sudan will remain under the control of the North and the dream of forefathers of South Sudan separatists and liberation movement will die.

In the case of Darfur the situation is rather different. Al Bashir was indicted and the ICC issued an arrest warrant, but the population of Darfur see Al Bashir like Saul of Tarsus who persecuted thechurch of Christ and became one of the best apostles of Christ to advance the church mission. With support and extra funding from Arab princes and heads of states, Al Bashir is currently building 100 pilot housing projects to relocate IDPs from their camps to new housing (built with red brick). Each house consists of two bedrooms, bathroom, and kitchen, and 85 medical clinics. With this real development on the ground, would the IDPs vote for Al Bashir or Abdu Wahide Nur who lives in Francesince 2007 and is invisible on the ground?

Election riggings and frauds such as those that occurred in Nigeria in June 12, 1993, Iran in June 2009, Kenya in 2007, Zimbabwe in 2008, and Afghanistan in 2009 should be an eye opener for the chairman of NEC who was appointed by SPLM. The decision of NEC to print presidential ballots in government owned printing press was the beginning of unfair rigging and possible fraud of election materials. The contract could have been awarded to privates printing companies to prevent boycotts and withdrawal of some political parties from the election. To prevent rigging, fraud, and manipulation of the cast ballots through logistic processes; the cast votes must be counted at the polling centers by the end of each day especially the cast ballots from outside Khartoum. Failure to do so results in boxes being changed during the transportation from polling centers to counting centers in Khartoum and stuffing of boxes with unofficial votes.

It has been almost six years of transitional period that the South will determine whether it wants to secede via referendum, or remain a part of united Sudan. However, the road to the referendum is fair, free, transparent, credible, inclusive, legitimate, accountable, and follows the rule of law in the election process. Are there any lessons that can be learnt from Kenya’s last election?

Justin Laku©
University of Ottawa, Canada.